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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. §61-1-23, as amended, 1990, Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-14(1)
and (3)(a), and Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(a)i(b)l(c)-(d)-(e)l(o)i(h)(i)l(h)(ii)i(h)(iii)- and
(h)(iv) confer exclusive jurisdiction on this Court to review "final agency actions" of Utah
administrative adjudicative proceedings. Furthermore, the Department of Commerce
Executive Director's October 29, 1990, Order on Agency Review specifically notifies
Petitioners of their right to bring this judicial appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The issues in this case involve Rules 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and 56, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. They further, and most importantly, involve the admitted conflict between
state and federal securities regulation, and, as a result, numerous constitutional issues
arising therefrom, including corollary confusion over statutory interpretation, not to
mention the interpretation and the validity of the agency "order" giving rise to the
proceedings below.
This case also involves whether a person who purchases stock in order to
comply with federal securities obligations can have his or her state securities brokerage
license taken away on the ground that such "purchases" allegedly constitute — at the same
time — a "dishonest or unethical business practice" under state law. [Emphasis
added.] This case further involves a determination of whether one who is in the class of
persons securities registration was designed to protect and who has no alternative but to
"purchase" stock from other persons who "allegedly" lack an exemption from registration,
can be liable for "aiding and abetting" the alleged non-exempt sale of such stock to himself.
In addition, this case involves whether a person's state brokerage license can be revoked or
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suspended for directly violating an alleged "order" that such person was never even charged
with having violated — an order improperly enforced and allegedly made "permanent"
without sufficient notice to Petitioners. Finally, this case involves a determination of
whether the sanction ultimately imposed on Petitioners for such alleged "dishonest or
unethical business practice" was arbitrary, capricious and excessive in comparison to prior
Division disciplinary actions.
(a) Standard of Review.
On the issues of law that Petitioners seek to raise, the standard of review is the
"correction-of-error" standard J Because the parties, for purposes of the July 16, 1990,
hearing, entered into a Stipulation of Facts, review of the entire proceeding must proceed
under the same standard.2 With respect to mixed questions of law and fact in which legal
issues predominate, "reasonableness" and "rationality" are the proper standards.3
Nonetheless, the record as a whole must be considered, including the body of
evidence opposed to the Division's view. R.H. Johnson & Co. v. Securities Exchange
Commission, 198 F.2d 690, 695 (2nd Cir.), cert, denied, 344 U.S. 855, 73 S.Ct. 94, 97
L.Ed. 664 (1952). See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95
L.Ed. 456 (1954); Klopp v. SEC, 427 F.2d 455, 460-61 (6th Cir. 1970)(a court of appeals is
not required to accept inferences drawn by the Commission unless it finds them to be
legitimate). Accordingly, the standard of review concerning issues of fact not covered by

-'-Bevans v. Industrial Commission, 790 P.2d 573 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)(under UAPA, Interpretations
or law are reviewed under non-dererent1al, correct1on-of-error standard).
^
VajJ Convalescent v. Division of Health Care Financing, 140 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 27 (Utah
Ct. App. I990)(conciuslons based on stipulated and undisputed facts are legal conclusions which
court reviews under correct1on-of-error standard).
3

Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc. v. Board of Review, 775 P.2d 439 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)(under UAPA,
Intermediate standard or reasonaoieness and rationality apply to review of mixed questions of law
and f a c t ) .

-2-

the Stipulation is whether the Petitioners' alleged "violation" was supported by "substantial
evidence" and whether the severe sanction imposed was "arbitrary." Whiteside &
Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 557 F.2d 1118, 1121 (5th Cir. 1977); Grace
Drilling v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990) (under UAPA, more rigorous
"substantial evidence" test applies to review of factual findings).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Based on the federal issues presented, the Supremacy and Commerce clauses
of the Constitution, including the mandate of comity, are in issue. Because of the Division's
inability to properly interpret and apply its own statutes, "orders", and statutory authority,
5th and 14th Amendment, including equal protection, issues are further presented. These
issues are grounded in part on substantial evidence that the Division was simultaneously
engaged in regulation and policy inconsistent with the charges brought against Petitioners.
Another issue is whether the statute involved namely, Utah Code Ann. §61-1-6(1 )(g), as
amended, 1989, including the Division's rule promulgated thereunder, are constitutionally
"vague and ambiguous" as applied to Petitioners herein. A final Constitutional issue is
whether the agency acted improperly in delegating judicial authority to the prosecutor and
vice-versa. (Reference is also made to the Constitutional issues raised in Petitioners'
related appeal on file herein, Case No. 900210-CA.)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
(a) Nature of the Proceedings.
This appeal is from the "final agency action" of certain administrative
adjudicative proceedings brought by the Utah Division of Securities ("Division") on April 27,
1989, to revoke or suspend the securities brokerage licenses of Petitioners. As a result of
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such proceedings, Petitioners are out-of-business and their securities brokerage licenses
have been suspended for one (1) year and they have been placed on an additional two (2)
years probation, a ruling which also leaves the Division with the peculiar ability to increase
its sanction against Petitioners in the interim at its discretion.
(b) Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.
Soon after filing its petitions in April 1989, the Division, moved the ALJ for an
order converting the proceedings from "informal" to "formal". On July 14, 1989, the ALJ
granted such motion. (Ex. M; R. 170-174.)
On July 14, 1989, the Division, realizing that its March 1, 1989, Summary Order
could not legally proscribe "purchases" of U.S.A. Medical securities, amended its petitions to
delete Count I thereof alleging that Petitioners directly violated such Order.4 (Ex. L; R.
161-168.) This left two causes of action, one for allegedly "engaging in dishonest or
unethical practices" and two, for allegedly violating so-called "suitability rules".
Because Petitioners believed the Division's amended petitions encroached
upon their SEC and NASD obligations under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, including
SEC and NASD rules promulgated thereunder, and a February 28, 1989, Ruling of
U.S. District Judge J. Thomas Greene, Petitioners filed a Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss the
Division's amended petitions, arguing that the Division lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to
discipline them for conduct undertaken by them solely to comply with federal law. (R.
239-241.) The ALJ denied such motion on August 29, 1989. (Ex. N; R. 149-153.)

^This fact
1990, Order
constitutes
of directly
1129-1141.)

is c r i t i c a l to this appeal because in the Securities Advisory Board's August 13,
— which, by virtue of Mr. Buhler's October 29, 1990, Order on Agency Review,
the Division's "final agency action" - - Petitioners have ironically been found guilty
violating such Order - - something with which they were never charged. (Ex. EE; R.
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On September 11. 1989. pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12. and the
applicable Department of Commerce Rule. Petitioners timely filed Requests for Agency
Review of such Order. (R. 139-143.) In other words, if the Division lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction because the same conduct of Petitioners was deemed "honest and ethical" by
the NASD, there was no reason to proceed with such administrative adjudicative
proceedings. Such Requests for Agency Review were denied by former Division Director
John C. Baldwin on October 30. 1989. (Ex. Q; R. 296-300.) (Such Order is the subject of the
related appeal before this Court. Case No. 900210-CA.)
Thereafter. Petitioners filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the ground
that the Division's amended petitions failed to state a claim. (R. 61-62.) The motion was
granted on December 18, 1989. as to Count II of the amended petitions, but not as to Count
I. leaving the "dishonest or unethical" cause of action intact. (Ex. T; R. 665-672.)
On November 28, 1989, Petitioners made a Rule 56(c) and (d) motion for
summary judgment dismissing the Division's amended petitions on several grounds. (R.
717-719.) Petitioners supported such motion by several affidavits. (Exs. U, V, W, and
affidavits attached to Ex. CC; R. 720-725, 738-755. 647-650. 694-95.) The Division
responded with its own cross-motion for summary judgment. Petitioners then responded
with a motion to strike certain purported "affidavits" submitted by the Division to resist
Petitioners' motion for summary judgment. (Ex. Z; R. 654-656.) Both motions for summary
judgment, including Petitioners' motion to strike, were denied by the ALJ on March 23,
1990. (Ex. AA; R. 597-608.) However, based on the Division's so-called opposing
"affidavits" (Ex. Y), the ALJ also ruled that there was an issue of fact as to "solicitation"
which he ruled should be tried before the entire Securities Advisory Board.
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Petitioners then filed a Request for Agency Review of the ALJ's March 23,
1990. Order denying Petitioners' Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 584-589.) On April 9,
1990, former Division Director Baldwin issued a second Order on Agency Review denying
such Request. (Ex. BB; R. 1230.)
A trial was had on the Division's amended petitions before the Securities
Advisory Board on July 16. 1990. the ALJ presiding. For purposes of such full hearing, the
parties entered into a detailed Stipulation of Facts with several exhibits. (Ex. CC; R.
1154-1190.) This is again critical to this appeal because Petitioners contend that the Board
and the ALJ, including former Division Director Baldwin, ignored such Stipulation of Facts in
reaching the Division's "final agency action" dated August 13, 1990. (See Vali Convalescent,
footnote 2, supra.) In other words, based on the Stipulation of Facts, a trial wasn't
necessary and the inevitable "sanction" could have been entered at that time. It is also
significant that by virtue of the ALJ's March 23, 1990, Order denying summary judgment and
the Stipulation of Facts, the only issue that should have been tried before the Securities
Advisory Board was the "solicitation" issue. Moreover, because the ALJ presided at such full
hearing on all the issues, he clearly ignored his own previous Rule 56(d) ruling.
On August 13, 1990, and as a result of the July 16, 1990, hearing, the Securities
Advisory Board, in conjunction with former Division Director Baldwin, issued the Division's
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. (Ex. EE; R. 1129-1141.)
On August 20, 1990, Petitioners filed an Objection to the Form and Content of
such August 13. 1990. Order. (Ex. FF; R. 1116-1120.) They further filed a Demand for
Disclosure of How and By Whom the August 13, 1990, Order was prepared and supported
the same with an affidavit. (Ex. GG and HH; R. 1112-1115 and 1121-25.) The basis for such
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was that Petitioners were convinced that the Division's counsel, not the ALJ. unilaterally
drafted the August 13,1990. Findings of Fact. Conclusions of Law. and Order. Such
demand, objection, and affidavit were entirely ignored. Petitioners believe such has
prejudiced them on appeal because they are "stuck" with "Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law" which are contrary to what they believe was actually adduced at the hearing. (R.
860-1111.) Petitioners believe such secret, ex parte assignment of judicial authority to the
prosecutor is an unconstitutional delegation of power.
On October 29, 1990. Department of Commerce Executive Director Buhler
issued an Order On Agency Review which blanketly adopts the Division's "final agency
action" of August 13, 1990. in its entirety. (Ex. II; R. 830-842.) Such Order adds nothing
significant to Petitioners' assignments of error, assignments which have only been repeated
and embraced by Mr. Buhler, even in light of a September 10. 1990. letter to Mr. Buhler from
Petitioners' counsel designed to clarify the task that was then before him. (R. 843-851.)
Finally, there is no evidence in the record that Petitioners did not at all times
act reasonably and in good faith. In fact, the August 13. Findings of Fact. Conclusions of
Law and Order repeatedly and callously acknowledge Petitioners' dilemma respecting the
competing and conflicting state and federal regulatory obligations while, at the same time,
disposing of the entire proceedings in the Division's favor. (Ex. EE; R. 1129-1141.)
RELEVANT FACTS
1. Petitioners Johnson-Bowles Company. Inc. ("Johnson-Bowles"), a securities
broker-dealer, and Marlen V. Johnson ("Johnson"), a securities agent, were licensed with
the Utah Securities Division ("Division") at all times material to this appeal. (R. 149.)
Petitioners were also registered with and governed by the National Association of Securities

-7-

Dealers, Inc. ("NASD"), a self-regulatory securities organization governed by the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC").5 (Ts 2 and 3, R. 205.)
2. During the latter part of 1988 and January 1989, Johnson-Bowles was
trading, primarily on a wholesale basis, the securities of U.S.A. Medical Corporation
("U.S.A. Medical"), a "publicly-held" Wyoming corporation. U.S.A. Medical was engaged in
the development and manufacture of novel liposuction devices. The stock traded as high as
one dollar ($1.00) per share. (R. 927.) At that time, the Company had 2.6 million shares
issued and outstanding. (R. 77, top.)
3. In late December 1988, a customer of Johnson-Bowles named Rick
Hermanson sold 15,000 shares of U.S.A. Medical to and through Johnson-Bowles which he
subsequently failed to deliver. (R. 928-929.)
4. On January 23, 1989, U.S.A. Medical suddenly undertook a 10-for-1 forward
split of its shares resulting in 26 million shares being issued and outstanding. As a result
and as a consequence of other trading that Johnson-Bowles had undertaken since
December 1988, Johnson-Bowles was suddenly "short" approximately 530,000 shares as
opposed to 53,000 shares, an amount which included the 150,000 (15,000 x 10) shares Rick
Hermanson failed to deliver earlier in the month. (R. 930.) Being "short" meant that
Johnson-Bowles owed such stock to other NASD member broker-dealers and clearing
corporations and agents but that it had no stock to effect physical delivery.

5 I t 1s significant that under the Exchange Act all broker-dealers and brokers who are not
members of a national securities exchange must, by law, be registered with the NASD. For
example, 1n 1983, the SEC did away with SECO, a self-regulatory organization that competed, to a
small degree, with the NASD. (R. 9, top.) As a practical matter, however, everyone 1n the
business 1s registered with the NASD. This 1s confirmed by Schedule C to the NASD By-Laws which
require the regltratlon of a l l persons "who are engaged 1n the Investment banking or securities
buslnesss" . . . .
NASD Manual (CCH) 11784, p. 1533 and 11785, p. 1541, Rel. #304 (Oct. 1990).

5. After the January 23, 10-for-1 forward split, the price of U.S.A. Medical
stock skyrocketed back up to approximately $1.00 per share (or $10.00 per share on the old
stock) within a matter of days. (Chart Exhibit R-4 admitted into evidence at the hearing, R.
927; Stipulated Facts for Purposes of Hearing, *4, p. 2, Ex. CC; 14, p. 2, R. 1155.) 6 As a
result of being unable to "cover" its 500,000 share "short" position and because an individual
named Reed Petersen suddenly contacted Petitioner Marien V. Johnson to sell him as many
shares of U.S.A. Medical as Mr. Johnson wanted "under the table" for 450 per share,
Petitioners realized that the securities of U.S.A. Medical were held by an elite group of
"control persons" and that Johnson-Bowles was the victim of a primitive stock fraud
scheme known as a "short squeeze".
6. There is no dispute that Johnson-Bowles complied with all rules and
regulations in having sold securities of U.S.A. Medical "short".**
7. Based on Johnson-Bowies' some-500,000 share post-split "short" position,
Petitioners immediately went to the SEC, the NASD and the Division, each of whom offered

6
Wh1le U.S.A. Medical's f i n a n c i a l statements (See Exhibit "H" to Respondents' Hearing Exhibit
R-5, a copy of the Judge Greene complaint, contained 1n Hearing Exhibits Accordlan Folder.)
showed about $42,849 1n gross sales during a year period, the Company, a f t e r the f o r w a r d - s p l i t ,
had a market c a p i t a l i z a t i o n of $26 m i l l i o n . In other words, U.S.A. Medical was suddenly trading
1n the public market as 1f 1t were a $26 m i l l i o n company when, 1n r e a l i t y , 1t was e f f e c t i v e l y
Insolvent.

7 A "short squeeze" may be defined as a fraud scheme 1n which brokers are d e l i b e r a t e l y "set up"
to get "short" and because no stock 1s available to "cover" the "short" p o s i t i o n s , the "control
persons" e i t h e r negotiate with the "short" broker to sell him or her stock d i r e c t l y or otherwise
through another broker, a l l at a p r i c e of the c r i m i n a l s ' choosing simply because they have a l l
the stock.
^See Reg. 240.3b-3, D e f i n i t i o n of "Short Sale", General Rules and Regulations of the Commission,
Fe"3rSec. L. Rep., Vol. 2, (CCH), 121,254 (Nov. 3, 1988); Reg. 240.10a-l, Short Sales, General
Rules and Regulations of the Commission, Fed. Sec. L. Rep., Vol. 3, 122,683 (August 12, 1987);
Reg. 240-10a-2, Requirements f o r Covering Purchases, General Rules and Regulations of the
Commission, Fed. Sec. L. Rep., Vol. 3, (CCH) 122,684 (July 1 , 1987); SEC Release No. 34-1571,
Short-Selling of Securities, February 5, 1938, 11 F.R. 10967, Fed. Sec. L. Rep., Vol. 3, (CCH)
122,685, et seq. (June 11, 1986); SEC Release No. 34-6778, Short Sales of Securities, A p r i l 16,
1962, 27 F 7 R r f 9 9 1 , Fed. Sec. L. Rep., Vol. 3, (CCH) 122,696 (June 11, 1986). The Court should
note that s e l l i n g securities "short" o r d i n a r i l y provides an Important and necessary market
function 1n our economy, namely, ensuring that a l l securities do not r i s e to an unlimited price
per share or any price f a r beyond the s e c u r l t y ' s T e g l t l m a t e value.
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no assistance. As a result and in an effort to protect itself and keep from being put out of
business through the execution of $500,000 worth of "buy-ins" at artificial and manipulated
prices, Johnson-Bowles brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah,
Central Division, on February 16, 1989, against numerous individuals it believed and had
come to discover were involved or otherwise orchestrating the "short squeeze" scheme.
(Hearing Exhibit R-5 admitted into evidence at July 16, 1990, hearing. See Hearing Exhibit
Accordion Folder.) Such defendants included both Reed Petersen and Rick Hermanson
referred to above, local attorney James L. Averett, along with their alleged co-conspirator,
five-time convicted felon Michael W. Strand. (See Caption on Hearing Exhibit R-5 and
Exhibits A and B thereto.)
8. The federal 10b-5 securities fraud action was assigned to U.S. District
Judge J. Thomas Greene, Case No. 89-C-157-G. In the same proceeding, Johnson-Bowles
included a second claim for declaratory relief which named all of the NASD member
broker-dealers and clearing agents and clearing corporations to whom it owed
U.S.A. Medical stock and who also owed it stock. The purpose of such second claim was to
seek a declaratory judgment that Johnson-Bowies' outstanding NASD contracts in the
securities of U.S.A. Medical be declared void for illegality. (Hearing Exhibit R-5.)
9. On February 17, 1989, Judge Greene granted Johnson-Bowles a TRO
enjoining Midwest Clearing — the party most other broker-dealer/parties were dependent
upon for their own securities clearing activities — from effecting "buy-ins" for the account
of Johnson-Bowles pending Johnson-Bowles1 hearing for preliminary injunction on
February 27, 10 days later. (R. 939; also, p. 5, Hearing Exhibit R-3, See Accordion Folder.)
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10. At the February 27 and 28, 1989, preliminary injunction hearing before
Judge Greene, testimony was adduced that the shareholders' list of U.S.A. Medical had been
"fabricated". (R. 941; also, Direct examination of Y. Barton pp. 10-41, Vol. I of Hearing
Exhibit R-6.) Further, testimony was adduced from Rick Hermanson that as much as
1,000,000 of U.S.A. Medical's previous 1,032,000 issued and outstanding shares had been
"boxed" or physically accumulated in his and one Jim Averett's office.^ (R. 940-41; See also
direct testimony of R. Hermanson, pp. 75-76, Vol. I of Hearing Exhibit R-6.)
11. Testimony was further adduced in Judge Greene's Court that between
200,000 to 250,000 shares had been distributed into the market out of the "box" by the
co-conspirators, and $45,000 to $55,000 in proceeds from such sales had been handedover to the Company. (Direct Testimony of Hermanson, p. 90, Vol. I of Hearing Exhibit
R-6.)10
12. After a two day evidentiary hearing on Johnson-Bowies' motion for
preliminary injunction, Judge Greene ruled on February 28, 1989, that the securities of
U.S.A. Medical were "unlawfully issued" and that they "had been and continue to be traded
as part of a fraudulent scheme and device to manipulate and artificially inflate the price of
that stock in violation of the securities laws", (p. 6, f ' s 2 and 3, Hearing Exhibit R-3.) At the
same time, Judge Greene denied Johnson-Bowles' motion for preliminary injunction, ruling
that the balance of interests or equities did not exclusively weigh in favor of
Johnson-Bowles, (p.6,15, Hearing Exhibit R-3.) Because Judge Greene did not grant

^Th1s l a t t e r point 1s significant 1n that 1t evidences that U.S.A. Medical was not and never had
been a legitimate "publicly-held" company and that 1t was Indeed controlled by an undisclosed,
select few.
lO"Th1s a m o u n * tracks the some-$42,000 accounted for as "sales" on U.S.A. Medical's fraudulent
financial statements. (See footnote 6 above.)
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Johnson-Bowles a preliminary injunction, Johnson-Bowles was left, on February 28, 1989,
with no choice but to somehow honor its outstanding NASD contracts or risk being
"bought-in" at artificial prices.11 (R. 204-208).
13. As a direct result of Judge Greene's ruling, during which officials from the
Division were present, the Division, on March 1, 1989, the following day, issued a Summary
Order denying the availability of all exemptions from registration under Utah Code
Ann. §61-1-14(2). (Ex. J; R. 274-278 and 50-54.) The Division enforced such Summary
Order longer than ten (10) days as prohibited under §61-1-14(3). Furthermore, the Order
makes no mention of "purchasing" securities for which, under all state and federal securities
laws, no exemption is (or ever has been) required.^
14. On March 27, 1989, the Division issued an order making its March 1, 1989,
Summary Order permanent by "default". (Ex. K; R. 1164-1168.) The record is bereft of any
evidence that Petitioners ever received any notice to contest, under §61-1-14(3), the
issuance of any such order on a "permanent" basis.
15. On March 6, 1989, the SEC suspended trading in U.S.A. Medical for ten (10)
days. (Ex. P; R. 56-57.) This is significant for purposes of demonstrating what a complete
fraud U.S.A. Medical was.

lln

Buy-1ns" are regular occurrences 1n the securities brokerage business when a broker has not
made timely delivery. "Buy-1n" procedure 1s set forth 1n Section 59 of the NASD Uniform Practice
Code, NASD Manual (CCH), "Close-Out Procedure", 13559, pp. 3577-3583, Rel. #195, (April 1982).
12 Securities laws only require that securities offered or sold be registered or that an
exemption therefrom be available. In the context of "purchases", nothing 1n the securities laws,
Including the '33 and '34 Acts, requires registration or exemption for "purchases". Congress

simply determined that the best way to regulate securities was to require registration or an

exemption for a sale.

(Citations omitted.)
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16. After February 2, 1989, one month in advance of the Division and the SEC's
Orders. Petitioners did not "trade" in the securities of U.S.A. Medical nor did they "sell" or
"offer to sell" any such securities. (R. 1042.)
17. Article III. 81, NASD Rules of Fair Practice which specifically governs both
Petitioners provides:
A member, in the conduct of his business, shall observe high
standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles
of trade.
This Rule is interpreted by the NASD and SEC to require a broker-dealer and broker to
honor all securities transactions or they will be subject to severe discipline including
substantial fines, suspension, and even expulsion from the NASD. (NASD Manual, (CCH)
12151 at p. 2013-3 and 13501, et seg. (May 1989); Ex. H; R. 176-179.)
18. At the same time, the North American Securities Administrators
Association ("NASAA") Guidelines, which govern and assist state securities regulatory
agencies such as the Division, define a "dishonest or unethical practice" using the exact
same language as that contained in Art. III. §1. NASD Rules of Fair Practice. (Ex. 0; R.
58-60.)
19. Division Rule R177-6-1 g. which further defines Utah Code Ann.
§61-1-6(1 )(g), as amended, 1989, the statute in issue in this case, is "patterned after
well-established standards in the industry which have been adopted by the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the NASD, NASAA, the national exchanges and various courts."
Preliminary Note 3, R177-6-1 g, Blue Sky L. Rep., Vol. 3, (CCH) 157,403, p. 50,507 Rel. #817
(April 1988). (Ex. B; R. 11.)
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20. The Division's March 1, 1989, Summary Order, by its own terms, did not
prohibit consummation of outstanding securities transactions by broker-dealers when
trading is suspended as specifically permitted under Securities Exch. Act Rel. No. 34-7920,
July 19, 1966, 31 F.R.D. 10076. (Ex. I; R. 55, 238 and Hearing Exhibit R-7.)
21. It being known in the local brokerage community that Johnson-Bowles was
"short" several hundred thousand shares of U.S.A. Medical, Petitioners were contacted in
late March 1989, by various individuals who were desirous of selling their U.S.A. Medical
securities to "cover" Johnson-Bowies' outstanding short positions. (Ex. U; R. 720-725.)
22. During early March 1989, while Johnson-Bowles1 contracts remained
outstanding, Petitioner Johnson was informed in person by Ken Schaeffer, Assistant
Director of the NASD's Denver Branch Office, that Petitioners would have to honor their
outstanding NASD contracts in the securities of U.S.A. Medical or they would be in violation
of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice. (R. 951-52 and 206). Mr. Johnson understood this to
mean that if Johnson-Bowles did not honor such contracts, disciplinary action would be
brought against he and Johnson-Bowles by the NASD to revoke or expel their memberships,
thereby putting them out-of-business. (R. 951-52 and 206.)
23. During late March and/or early April 1989, in reliance on Judge Greene's
ruling, interpretations of Art. Ill, 81, NASD Rules of Fair Practice, Ken Schaeffer's
admonitions, SEC Exchange Act Rel. #34-7920, the prospect of being put out-of-business
and looking at endless other litigation, including advice of counsel, Petitioner Johnson
purchased less than 400,000 shares of U.S.A. Medical securities from seven (7) individuals
to fulfill all of Johnson-Bowies' outstanding NASD contracts. 13 (R. 206.) Six (6) of such

1J
T h e reason Johnson-Bowles purchased less than 400,000 shares to complete I t s contracts when
i t had been over 500,000 shares "short11 1s that several broker-dealers to whom 1t owed stock
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individuals were Utah residents, one of which was a securities broker licensed with the
Division named Paul Jones. The seventh individual was a New York resident. (July 9, 1990,
Stipulated Facts for Purposes of Hearing, Ts 13, 14, and 16, Ex. CC; R. 1154-1190.)
24. Petitioners did not "solicit" the various individuals from whom they
ultimately purchased sufficient U.S.A. Medical securities to fulfill their outstanding NASD
contracts. (P. 6, H12, The Securities Advisory Board's August 13, 1990, Findings of Fact,
Ex. EE; R. 1129-41.) Furthermore, Petitioners, acting in good faith, provided each and all of
such individuals with full and complete disclosure of Judge Greene's ruling and the
Division's Summary Order. (Ex. U and affidavits attached to Ex. CC; R. 720-725. 738-755,
647-50, 694-95.) Petitioners further informed such individuals that the stock would be
used solely to fill Johnson-Bowles' outstanding short positions with its clearing brokers and
agents — transactions that had all occurred well in advance of February 28, 1989. (Ex. U;
R. 720-725.)
25. The NASD member clearing brokers and corporations who ultimately
received delivery of U.S.A. Medical stock from Petitioners in late March/early April 1989 had
actual notice of both Judge Greene's ruling and the Division's March 1, Summary Order and
each accepted "delivery" of such shares with full knowledge as contemplated in Article 8 of
the Uniform Commercial Code. As a result, and with the exception of one contract involving
OTRA Clearing, Inc., Johnson-Bowles flattened-out all of its pre-March 1, NASD
contracts. (R. 958.)

"D-K'd" or cancelled the trades after Judge Greene's ruling. Further, Johnson-Bowles Itself
"D-K'd" trades or "reclaimed" stock owed 1t by other broker-dealers. In addition, Johnson-Bowles
had over 100,000 shares "bought-in" on March 1, 1989, by broker-dealer OTRA Clearing, Inc., at
approximately 70$ per share or over $100,000.
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26. On April 27. 1989. and as a result of the foregoing, the Division brought
administrative adjudicative proceedings against Petitioners seeking to revoke their
registrations with the Division for allegedly violating Utah Code Ann. §61-1-6(1 )(g). namely,
the prohibition against engaging in "dishonest or unethical business practices".
(R. 263-294.) Chronological details of these proceedings have been set forth separately
above.
27. While the Division was absolutely convinced that Petitioners "made a lot of
money" in "covering" their "short positions." the fact is that excluding well over $150,000 in
attorney's and accountant's fees and costs Petitioners have incurred in the Judge Greene
and this litigation. Petitioners only made a "profit" on "covering" their "shorts" in the amount
of some-$6.000. (R. 1046.)
28. No one was damaged or potentially damaged by Petitioners' conduct in
fulfilling Johnson-Bowles' federal NASD contracts. (R. 37.) To be sure, by completing their
outstanding NASD contracts and obligations. Petitioners prevented numerous NASD
member broker-dealers and clearing corporations from using their own money to effect no
less than $500,000 worth of "buy-ins" for Johnson-Bowles' account, money that such
entities would never have been able to recover from Petitioners or anyone else because
Johnson-Bowles would have been bankrupt. (R. 9 5 4 . ) ^ Further, by completing such
contracts, Johnson-Bowles complied with its obligations under NASD and SEC rules which
require members to complete all NASD-related transactions. (See 117 above.)

14
That Johnson-Bowles would have been out-of-business had the "buy-Ins" occurred 1s evidenced
by the very purpose of the Judge Greene litigation. In fact, the NASD was literally sitting on
Petitioners' desks during February end/March beginning 1989, requiring them to perform
Innumerable "what If" net capital calculations based on the "value" of U.S.A. Medical and the
prospective "buy-Ins". (R. 1038, 930, and 950.)
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29. Petitioners were required to vigorously resist the Division's amended
petitions in that the Division extortionately and unreasonably demanded settlement from
them as follows:
a.

suspensions of Petitioners' brokerage licenses, including extended
probation; and

b.

a $25,000 fine from each Petitioner or a total of $50,000.

(R. 894.) The foregoing settlement demand was "generously" offered by the Division even
though, as a matter of law, it had no power or authority whatsoever to extract or demand
"fines" from Petitioners. (See Utah Code Ann. §61-1-6 as effective prior to July 1, 1990; Ex.
A.) The foregoing is further not to ignore that Johnson-Bowles could not have operated
during a suspension of its registered principal Marlen V. Johnson and therefore, the
Division's unlawful settlement demands had the express design of putting Petitioners
completely out-of-business. In addition, the foregoing settlement offer was further
extended by the Division when it could not point to one single, solitary Utah resident who
had been damaged or could ever be damaged by the conduct of Petitioners and when
Petitioners single-handedly took it upon themselves to uncover the entire U.S.A. Medical
fraud in federal court — something that the both the SEC and Division itself were unable
and unwilling to do in early February 1989. 15 (R. 930.) For instance, had it not been for
Johnson-Bowles' uncovering of the U.S.A. Medical fraud in Judge Greene's court, the
Division would never have been able to enter its March 1, 1989, Summary Order to allegedly
protect Utah residents from subsequent unlawful distributions of U.S.A. Medical securities.
l ^ I n terms of similar regulatory bloodlust and retaliation, compare the stark similarity
between this case and the aiding and abetting case of SEC v. Dirks, (U.S. Sup. Court, July 1,
1983) 463 U.S. 646, 77 L.Ed.2 911, 103 S.Ct. 3255, ['82-'83 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 199,255, n. 8, p. 96,124 ("JUSTICE BLACKMUN's dissenting opinion minimizes the role Dirks
played 1n making public the Equity Funding fraud
The dissent would rewrite the history of
Dirks' extensive Investigative e f f o r t s . , . . Largely thanks to Dirks one of the most infamous
frauds 1n recent memory was uncovered and exposed, while the record shows that the SEC repeatedly
missed opportunities to Investigate Equity Funding.71 LEmphasis added.]
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Additional Facts Relevant to this Appeal.
30. On August 9,1989, during the pendency of these proceedings below, the
Division issued, relative to U.S.A. Medical, a private and secret No-Action Letter for the
benefit of one Susan Slattery, a local securities broker licensed with the Division. In such
unpublicized pronouncement which Petitioners only learned of by accident, the Division
informed Ms. Slattery that she could "direct trades" in the securities of U.S.A. Medical from
the State of Utah, provided that neither the buyer nor seller were Utah residents. (Ex. S; R.
440, 429, and 1146.) Ms. Slattery was employed by local broker-dealer P.B. Jameson, the
principal distributor of U.S.A. Medical securities and which was "long"16 at least 1.5 million
shares of U.S.A. Medical at February end 1989. (R. 21-22.) Ms. Slattery was also intimately
associated with five-time convicted felon Michael W. Strand, one of the named
co-conspirators in the Judge Greene litigation who allegedly perpetrated the U.S.A. Medical
fraud and "short squeeze", (f48, R. 463 and K230, R. 525.)
31. On September 1, 1989, during the pendency of these proceedings, the
Division issued a Press Release in which it stated that all problems associated with U.S.A.
Medical would be resolved upon the Company's filing of a registration statement with the
Division. (Ex. X; R. 716.)
32. On March 1, 1989, the very day the Division issued its Summary Order
suspending trading, Utah licensed broker-dealers P.B. Jameson and R.A. Johnson sold at
least 150,000 shares of U.S.A. Medical through the market. (R. 946-949.) The Division has
yet to bring a disciplinary action against either P.B. Jameson or R.A. Johnson for directly

lb

Be1ng "long" means that P.B. Jameson had such stock 1n I t s trading Inventory. (See Vol. 1 ,
p. 171, 1. 10-11 and Vol. I I , Part 2, p. 260, 1. 24-25, p. 261, 1. 1 , Respondents' Rearing
Exhibit R-6.)

-18-

violating the Division's Summary Order and, to date, it has only brought one action against
one licensed agent, namely Paul Jones, who sold U.S.A. Medical stock in alleged violation of
such Summary Order. (Ex. KK.) At the same time, the Division, after filing such action, has
done nothing more to Mr. Jones and such action has remained open since August 1,1989,
Mr. Jones being permitted in the interim to continue to act as a licensed agent with the
Division. (Ex. KK.)
33. The Division has given Petitioners access to all of its prior disciplinary
actions brought against registered broker-dealers and agents and none is remotely
comparable to the sanction imposed herein upon Petitioners relative to the alleged conduct
complained of. (Ex. KK.) For instance, licensed securities agent Craig Cannon, who
admittedly defrauded elderly people out of their life savings, was only given a two (2) year
suspension and no "fine". (Footnote, R. 44.) Further, Mr. Cannon was not ordered to make
any restitution to his victims.
34. On July 2, 1990, the U.S. Attorney brought an Amended Felony Information
against local attorney James L. Averett. (Ex. JJ.) (See %7 and % 10 above.) Averett, on
September 17, 1990, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit securities fraud and under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines he received mere probation. (Ex. JJ.) While Petitioners are
out-of-business and unemployed as a result of the vicious proceedings below, Averett
remains a member in good standing of the Utah State Bar.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Petitioners were victims of a flagrant securities fraud, unparalleled in the State
of Utah, one which prevented them from obtaining physical possession of any stock to
effect delivery to those to whom they owed such stock. In fact, such was the very purpose
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of the fraud, namely, to drive the price of the stock so high that Petitioners and those
similarly caught in the "short squeeze" would have to buy it at artificially created
prices — thereby making the perpetrators handsome illicit profits. Unfortunately, the
Division has never been able to comprehend that Petitioners' conduct was wholly justified in
order to extricate themselves from a fraud in which they were simple victims.
In an effort to protect themselves, and getting no assistance from the SEC, the
NASD, or the Division — something which was their job, not Petitioners — Petitioners
sought relief in federal court. Based on the equities, the federal court refused to declare
Petitioners' outstanding contracts in the securities of U.S.A. Medical "void for illegality".
However, such ruling, coupled with the NASD rules governing Petitioners, had the effect of
compelling Petitioners to honor their federal contracts regardless. Nonetheless, U.S.
District Judge Greene did rule that the stock of U.S.A. Medical was both "unlawfully issued"
and the subject of securities fraud and market manipulation. Based on such federal ruling
— a ruling which was the exclusive result of Petitioners' "whistleblowing" — the Division
suspended trading in the stock of U.S.A. Medical the following day. Such March 1, 1989,
Summary Order, designed solely to protect Utah residents from unlawful distributions of
U.S.A. Medical stock, is the subject of this case.
Knowing that they could not afford to reimburse all of the broker-dealers and
clearing corporations and agents who would have effected "buy-ins" at lord knows what
price and, knowing that any money so expended would have gone directly into the pockets
of the perpetrators of the fraud, Petitioners privately purchased sufficient U.S.A. Medical
stock from 7 individuals to flatten-out their contracts. Yet regardless of an SEC Release
allowing consummation of brokerage transactions during a trading suspension (Ex. I), the
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Division interpreted Petitioners' perfunctory and ministerial conduct as a violation of its
March Summary Order and initiated the proceedings subject of this appeal to revoke or
suspend their brokerage licenses.
This case is thus about whether the conduct of Petitioners, under such
extremely unusual circumstances — conduct which was, at all times, reasonable and in
good faith, if not noble — constitutes grounds to revoke or suspend their Utah brokerage
licenses.
Assuming the Summary Order was properly interpreted (which it wasn't).
Petitioners submit that there is nothing else they could have done. In fact, acting like sitting
ducks and waiting for $500,000 worth of "buy-ins" would have been stupid and would have
only consummated the fraud. Furthermore, on the basis of pure logic, there is no
difference between purchasing the stock themselves or some out-of-state resident
purchasing the stock for Johnson-Bowies' account — a non-distinction the Division has
also never been able to comprehend.
This case is about an administrative agency which ignorantly believed that
Petitioners made a lot of money "covering" their "short" positions on the basis of the
Division's Order — an order which had the practical effect of making U.S.A. Medical stock
worthless — a price it should have been all along. Yet instead of finding out that
Petitioners did not make any money, and that they did not do what they did simply to make a
meager $6,000, the Division blindly and ignorantly embarked on a malicious and asinine
campaign to put Petitioners out-of-business — as if Petitioners alone perpetrated the
entire U.S.A. Medical fraud.
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Whatever Petitioners did wrong (which is nothing), the most it could ever be is
the most hyper-technical violation of anything. Yet the Division, in painting Petitioners as
greedy, irresponsible persons, hell-bent on eviscerating the Division's "too-little, too-late"
order, the Division has now put Petitioners out-of-business. On the contrary, Petitioners'
conduct damaged! no one and in fact, no one other than the U.S.A. Medical criminals and the
Division could have cared less what Petitioners did. The irony of this case is that the
Division has gone to bat for the criminals who perpetrated the U.S.A. Medical fraud and left
no government resource unavailable to destroy Petitioners for doing the Division's own
work for it.
This Court should not only reverse and vacate the proceedings below, but it
should send a strong message to all administrative agencies not to waste the taxpayers'
money pursuing personal agendas that are not "in the public interest". Why would any Utah
resident care if Petitioners bought U.S.A. Medical stock to keep several out-of-state
fellow-NASD members from losing several hundred thousand dollars? There is and was
nothing to be proven by these entire administrative adjudicative proceedings; any lesson to
be learned, the Petitioners learned on their own with their own money and resources. This
entire case is a pathetic waste of human resources, energy, and money and this Court
should issue a decision, informing the Division and all other Utah administrative agencies
that this type of blind abuse of government power and authority — a monument to sheer
pointlessness — should not be tolerated.
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT
ORDERS AND AGENCY ACTION FROM WHICH APPEAL IS
SOUGHT AND REASONS WHY SUCH ARE ERRONEOUS AND
THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS SHOULD BE REVERSED AND VACATED.
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1. THE ALJ'S JULY 14, 1989, ORDER GRANTING THE DIVISION'S MOTION TO
CONVERT THE PROCEEDINGS FROM INFORMAL TO FORMAL IS ERRONEOUS AND HAS
PREJUDICED PETITIONERS. ACCORDINGLY, THE PROCEEDINGS SHOULD BE REVERSED. (Ex.
M;R. 170-174.)
On April 27, 1989, the Division filed its initial petitions against Petitioners
herein. Under Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-4, the proceedings were specifically designated by
the Division as informal proceedings. In response, Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as incorporated into such proceedings
under Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-1(4)(b). (R. 239-241.) Whereupon the Division moved the
ALJ for an order converting the proceedings from informal to formal. The Division
undertook such even though its own internal rule then in effect, specifically, R177-46b-6B,
designated all such proceedings as "informal". (R. 171.) 17
The Division argued for such conversion solely on the ground that it "believed"
Petitioners would be strenuously resisting the proceedings. As set forth in the ALJ's July
14, 1989, Order granting such Division motion, the ALJ singularly reasoned that "agency
expertise" justified such conversion. (Ex. M; R. 170-174.) This result was obtained even
though the ALJ, an employee of the Department of Commerce, had no particular expertise
in securities matters and may have had even less expertise than most, if not all, third district
court judges. This result was also obtained even though, later on, in March 1990, the ALJ
deferred his obligation to make a determination as to Petitioners' liability to the Securities
Advisory Board, a decision which was not only expensive for everyone concerned, but wholly
unnecessary. (Ex. AA; R. 597-608.)

l^To remedy this "problem" 1n the future, the Division amended i t s administrative rules
effective July 1 , 1990. (Blue Sky L. Rep., Vol. 3, (CCH), Rule R177-18-6, 157,421, Rel. #873,
7-1-90.)
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The ALJ's July 14, 1989, Order is erroneous because it deprived Petitioners of
a trial de novo in the district court as our legislature has unambiguously provided in Utah
Code Ann. §63-46b-15(1 )(a). Furthermore, the fact that the Division "thought" the
Petitioners would be strenuously resisting the proceedings is not a legitimate ground
justifying such conversion under any circumstances. Yet this is precisely why the ALJ found
in favor of the Division. In addition, if "agency expertise" were the sole test of whether the
"public interest" was satisfied, all proceedings could be converted to formal at the mere
insistence of the agency and Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-15(1)(a) would have no meaning. In
short, such Order is erroneous because the Division failed to carry its admitted burden that
in this case (1) conversion was in the "public interest" and (2) conversion would not "unfairly
prejudice the rights [of Petitioners]." Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-4(3).
Being deprived of a trial de novo in the district court is prejudicial error
justifying reversal because Petitioners may have well had this entire case resolved at that
level. As is now the case, however, these proceedings — which continued for 1% years
without interruption — have been far more expensive than would have been the case had
Petitioners been availed of their right to first proceed in district court. This is because
Petitioners, knowing the results below were a foregone conclusion, may have chosen not to
resist the proceedings, opting instead to seek a a trial de novo in the district court when the
opportunity was available. Certainly, "public interest" is broader and requires a far greater
showing than paying lip service to the words "agency expertise". In fact, if "public interest"
is the sole criterion, it is significant that not one single member of the public was ever
present at any hearing in the proceedings below.
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2. THE ALJ's AUGUST 29, 1989, ORDER DENYING PETITIONERS' MOTION TO
DISMISS THE DIVISION'S AMENDED PETITIONS UNDER RULE 12(b)(1), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE, FOR LACK OF SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION IS ERRONEOUS. (Ex. N;
R. 149-153.) BECAUSE THE DIVISION LACKED SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION UNDER THE
PECULIAR FACTS OF THIS CASE, THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW SHOULD HAVE BEEN
DISMISSED.
A. Under the facts of this case, the Division's disciplinary actions are
regulation inconsistent with the pre-emptive SEC and NASD regulatory scheme and
Petitioners' obligations thereunder. Because such state action is repugnant to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 over which federal courts have exclusive Jurisdiction and it
is otherwise an illogical attempt to frustrate a federal purpose, the proceedings below
should have been dismissed.
Johnson-Bowles, as an SEC and NASD registered broker-dealer, effected sales
of securities of U.S.A. Medical to certain out-of-state NASD member broker-dealers and
one out-of-state clearing corporation, namely Midwest Clearing, prior to the Division's
March 1, 1989, Summary Order. These federal NASD contracts remained outstanding after
March 1, 1989, regardless of such state order. Article III, §1, NASD Rules of Fair Practice,
has been interpreted to require completion of all broker-dealer contracts and the failure to
do so is inconsistent with "observing high standards of commercial honor and just and
equitable principles of trade." Article III, §1, NASD Rules of Fair Practice, NASD Manual,
(CCH), 52151, p. 2014, Rel. #303. (See 517, Stmt, of Facts above.) For instance, it is wellsettled that failure of a broker-dealer or broker to honor securities trades is violative of
Article III, 81. In re: Shaskan & Co., Inc., SEC Docket 775 (May 28, 1976)(NASD suspended
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and imposed fine on brokers for failing to honor trades with other NASD members);
Friedman & Co.. 45 S.E.C. 393 (1973)(failing to honor trades is a violation of Article III, §1
and expulsion from NASD and revocation without qualification may be imposed).
Section 19 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"), 15 U.S.C.
78a-78jj. as amended, confers authority to establish self-regulatory organizations ("SRO")
such as the NASD. In §19(g)(1), Compliance and Enforcement of Compliance, the Exchange
Act provides:
(g)(1) every self-regulatory organization shall comply with the
provisions of this title, the rules and regulations thereunder, and
its own r u l e s , . . . . [Emphasis added.]
Section 19(h)(2), further provides in substance that a self-regulatory organization (i.e., the
NASD) may expel a member who has violated the SRO's rules and regulations. Based on the
foregoing, it is evident that had Johnson-Bowles failed to honor its contractual NASD
obligations it would have been subject to expulsion, fine, and censure by the NASD. (See
Annotations to Art. III. §1. NASD Rules of Fair Practice. NASD Manual (CCH), supra.) Since
the NASD was created and because it is governed exclusively by the SEC under the
Exchange Act, 1 8 it is significant that any dispute relative to such Act must be brought in a
district court of the United States. For instance, Section 27 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§78aa, provides in part:
The District Court of the United States and the United States
courts of any territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations
of this title or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all
suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability
or duty created by this title or the rules and regulations
thereunder. [Emphasis added.]
l^For an Informative discussion of the NASD and how 1t 1s directly regulated by the SEC and
must, as a matter of law, comply with a l l the provisions of the Exchange Act, I t s own rules, and
tfie~rules of both the SEC and the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board ("MSRB"), reference 1s
made to Austin Municipal Securities, Inc. v. NASD, 757 F.2d 676, ['84-'85 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 192,027 (5th Clr! 1985).
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The Division's amended petitions usurp the NASD's pre-emptive authority and
power by attempting to discipline the Petitioners simply for complying with their explicit and
unequivocal (i.e., exclusively federal) obligations as NASD members. In other words, implicit
in the Division's amended petitions is the conviction that it has power and authority to
compel NASD-member Petitioners to violate NASD rules.
The Utah Court of Appeals has recently addressed this very issue. In Western
Capital & Securities, Inc. v. Knudsvig, (Ut. Ct. of App. Case No. 880198-CA, February 7,
1989). 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 65, 768 P.2d 989, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH),
f 94,337, this very Court held that the issue of violating or interpreting NASD Rules "comes
under the regulatory provisions of the Exchange Act and is subject to exclusive federal
jurisdiction." Western Capital, supra at p. 92,193. The Division's attempt to discipline
Petitioners merely for complying with their NASD and SEC obligations is in direct conflict
with the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 over which federal courts (or even the NASD itself)
have exclusive jurisdiction and therefore, the Division lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over
these proceedings. Thus, the amended petitions should have been dismissed under Rule
12(b)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
B. The Division's amended petitions give unlawful extra-territorial effect to its
March 1, 1989, Summary Order.
The Division has attempted to unlawfully give its March 1, Summary Order
exclusive application to Petitioners as NASD members doing business out-of-state and
further give it effect on several out-of-state broker-dealers and one out-of-state clearing
corporation, all of which do no business in Utah. This is an effort on the part of the Division
to give unlawful, extra-territorial effect to its March 1, Summary Order. Singer
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v. Magnavox, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977), [ 7 1 - 7 8 Transfer Binder] Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH)
171,399 (holding that a state cannot give extra-territorial effect to its own Blue Sky laws).
Exclusive application of the Division's Summary Order to Johnson-Bowies'
interstate business dealings is further penal in nature and therefore unconstitutional. In
Schemmer v. Property Resources, Ltd., (1975) Ch. 273, (1974) 3 All. Er. 451, (1974) 3 WLR
406, an English chancery court refused to give extra-territorial effect to the United States
securities laws, holding that the same were penal in nature. Though Schemmer is an English
case, it is well reasoned and cited by noted authorities for this very proposition in the Blue
Sky law context. (See Joseph C. Long, Blue Sky Law, "Conflict of Laws", Clark Boardman
Securities Law Series, Ch. 3, §§3.01-3.05[2], pp. 3-1 through 3-118, Vol. 12, April 1988.)
Accordingly, to give validity to the Division's amended petitions is nothing less than
penalizing Johnson-Bowles for having sold securities out-of-state prior to March 1, 1989,
acts performed in the normal course of everyday NASD business.
One of the parties from whom Petitioners purchased U.S.A. Medical securities
— who is identified in the amended petitions — is Sheldon Flateman, a New York resident,
(p. 5, Ex. L; R. 165.) The Division contends that Flateman himself violated the Division's
March 1, Order. As a result, the Division's March 1, Order is given further unlawful
extra-territorial effect by attempting to suspend exemptions in other states such as the
State of New York. This untenable position is antithetical to well-settled conflicts of law
problems in the Blue Sky law area. See Lintz v. Carey Manor, Ltd., 613 F. Supp. 543, 550-51
(D.C. Va. 1985)(holding that two separate states' Blue Sky laws apply to the same
transaction if both states have jurisdiction over such transaction).
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The Division's action is an attempt to prevent interstate securities transactions
from having been completed. Accordingly, it has the practical effect of regulating and
controlling conduct beyond the boundaries of Utah in violation of the Commerce Clause.
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 775 (1945). The limits on a state's power to
enact substantive legislation are similar to the limitation on the jurisdiction of state courts.
In either case, "any attempt 'directly' to assert extra-territorial jurisdiction over persons or
property would offend sister States and exceed the inherent limits of a State's
power." Schafer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 197 (1977).
There is absolutely no difference between Johnson-Bowles' purchase of U.S.A.
Medical stock to cover its "short position" and the purchase by its fellow NASD members
and clearing agents of U.S.A. Medical stock for Johnson-Bowies' account. [Emphasis
added.] Putting it another way, what difference does it make who buys the stock if it is by
and for Johnson-Bowles? Because the reality is that "buy-ins" would have similarly violated
the March Summary Order, such order is given extra-territorial effect.
While the ALJ and the Division take the ridiculous position that
Johnson-Bowles should have sat back and allowed $500,000 worth of "buy-ins", the ALJ's
Order ignores that the subject out-of-state entities would have more than likely had to
purchase stock from the State of Utah inasmuch as virtually all of the stock of U.S.A.
Medical was in the State of Utah. (See f 10. Stmt, of Facts above.) For this reason, the fact
that Johnson-Bowles purchased the stock itself for its own account as opposed to
negligently allowing someone else to purchase it for its own account from Utah at a price it
had no control over is a distinction without a difference. The August 29, Order concluded
the contrary and is thus erroneous.
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The above points mandate that the proceedings below be dismissed and that
the August 29, Order be reversed.
C. Under the "Non-Delegation Doctrine" in administrative law, the August 29,
Order or Ruling is erroneous and must be reversed.
The ALJ's Order of August 29, is repugnant to the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. This is because Congress has specifically delegated the power and authority to
regulate interstate trading of securities to the SEC and the NASD thereunder. Section 27 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. §77aa, provides that any suit "to enforce
any liability or duty created by this Chapter [the '34 Act]" must be brought in a U.S. District
Court. The Utah Department of Commerce's ALJ is not a district court of the United
States. Section 27 broadly encompasses all suits to enforce or interpret "any . . . duty
created by" the Act. [Emphasis added.] Leroy, Attorney General of the State of Idaho v.
Great Western United Corp., (U.S. Sup. Ct., 1979), 443 U.S. 173, 61 LEd.2d 464, 99
S.Ct. 2710, ['78 -'81 Transfer Binder] Blue Sky L. Rptr. (CCH) 171,488 at p.68,611 (Justice
White). In this regard, what "duty" could be more applicable to the Exchange Act than the
very Exchange Act duty and obligation to complete interstate brokerage transactions under
Act III, §1 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice? Because the dispute in this case goes to the
very existence and purpose of SEC and NASD rules governing broker-dealers operating
interstate, the Division's efforts to prohibit compliance with SEC and NASD rules and
regulations is a usurpation of power and authority not delegated to it.
Section 28(a) of the Act provides in part that:
Nothing in this title shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities
commission (or any agency or officer performing like functions)
of any State over any security or any person insofar as it does
not conflict with the provisions of this title or the rules and
regulations thereunder. [Emphasis added.]
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15 U.S.C.A. §78bb(a). Section 28(a) of the Exchange Act thus imposes an "affirmative duty"
on states, not to regulate inconsistently with federal mandate, the violation of which must
be redressed in the federal courts under §27. Leroy, supra at p.68,607. In short, the
purpose of §28(a) was to leave the states with as much leeway to regulate securities
transactions as the Supremacy Clause would allow them (in the absence of such a
provision). Leroy, supra at p. 68,608, note 13. In this case, the State of Utah has not been
delegated authority to regulate or enforce state administrative orders contrary to Article III,
§1 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice or any other SEC or NASD rule or regulation.
That the NASD and SEC and their concomitant rules and regulations are
embraced by the Exchange Act is specifically set forth in §15 and 15A of the Exchange Act.
(See Austin case cited in previous footnote.) This very Court confirmed a federal court's
exclusive jurisdiction to interpret NASD and SEC rules and regulations in Western Capital,
supra. The ALJ thus ignored the law, including the effect of Judge Greene's federal ruling.
The Supremacy and Commerce Clauses of the federal Constitution, and most,
if not all state Constitutions, impose limits upon the legislature's actions. (See People v.
Green, 1 U. 11. 15-16 (Utah 1876)(holding that the Utah legislature may not, under Article VI,
Sec. 1, of Utah's constitution, encroach upon the provisions of the federal Constitution nor
has it the power to increase or diminish powers of any federal court in this state).)
Nonetheless, the Division has brazenly taken upon itself the unlawful task of regulating and
disciplining Petitioners merely for obeying their Exchange Act obligations, obligations they
had every right to fulfill under the circumstances. (See SEC Exch. Act Rel. No. 34-7920; Ex.
I; Hearing Exhibit R-7.). 19
l ^ i f those to whom Petitioners owed stock could effect "buy-Ins" during the alleged pendency of
the Division's Summary Order, there would be no reason why this couldn't work both ways. Yet the
Division's position 1s that this I s n ' t the case simply because Petitioners were Utah residents
and for no other or better reason.
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The non-delegation doctrine in administrative law provides that a legislature
may not delegate full legislative powers to an agency that is repugnant to the Constitution.
The source of the doctrine is in the Constitution itself. Article 1, Section 1 provides that "all
legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in the Congress of the United States . . .
." Based on the non-delegation principle, state legislatures cannot confer duties and
authorities on administrative agencies that are repugnant to the federal Constitution or
federal enactments. To be sure, the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, Art. IV, cl. 2,
provides that if a state law conflicts with federal law, federal law necessarily prevails.
Based on this delegation of power, the existence of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
creates the right not to be subject to conflicting state regulation. [Emphasis
added.] Leroy, supra at p. 68,611. Viewed from the perspective of state officials, the
existence of the Exchange Act creates a duty in such individuals not to undertake
conflicting regulation efforts. Nonetheless, the instant proceedings could not be more
diametrically conflicting with SEC and NASD rules which compel broker-dealers and NASD
members to honor their trades, more especially in light of Judge Greene's February 28,
1989, ruling. Moreover, it is impossible to understand how Petitioners could have complied
with their NASD and SEC obligations and the Division's unilateral interpretation of its own
order at the same time. [Emphasis added.]
The important component of non-delegation is to whom the decision-making
power is given. For instance, Congress has not delegated Exchange Act authority to the
Utah legislature to in turn delegate the same authority to the Utah Securities Division to, in
its turn, inconsistently regulate and enforce that which specifically and exclusively comes
under the Exchange Act. Because the decision-making power to regulate trading in the
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over-the-counter securities markets in interstate commerce has been expressly delegated
to the SEC and NASD under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Division has no
jurisdiction to regulate Petitioners, inconsistently or at all, in this regard. (See e.g.,
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 25,669, 40 SEC Docket 1123 (1988)(giving the NASD
exclusive authority to prohibit members and associated persons from effecting over-thecounter transactions in securities subject of a trading halt).) Unfortunately, contrary
regulation is what the August 29, Order says the Division can do. Moreover, the preamble to
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides that it is:
An Act to provide for the regulation of securities exchanges and
of over-the-counter markets operating in interstate and foreign
commerce and through the mails, to prevent inequitable and
unfair practices on such exchanges and markets, and for other
purposes.
Based on the foregoing, it is legally impossible that the Division has jurisdiction to regulate
in a manner which is not only opposite to, but which fully frustrates specific federal
purposes. For this reason, the ALJ's Order of August 29, is erroneous and must be
reversed.
D. Based on the Division's own "enabling statute", the Division lacks power and
authority to regulate in a manner that conflicts with and supersedes the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and therefore, the Order of August 29, which erroneously concludes
the contrary, must be reversed.
Delegation, as discussed above, should not be confused with the ultra vires
doctrine in administrative law. This doctrine asks whether an agency is functioning within
its statutory powers. [Emphasis added.] The easy way to distinguish these two issues is to
keep in mind that the non-delegation principle involves a look the face of the agency's
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enabling act and does not normally inquire into subsequent actions taken by the agency's
administrator. Ultra vires, by contrast, presumes that the agency's enabling act contains a
proper standard (i.e., that it is constitutional on its face), and then investigates subsequent
agency action to see if that action is authorized.
The Division's enabling statute relative to these proceedings is contained in
Utah Code Ann. §61-1-6(1). (Ex. A.) This enabling statute does not give the Division power
or authority to revoke the registration of a broker-dealer or agent for complying or
attempting to comply with superseding SEC and/or NASD rules and regulations. It does not
say that the Division can override or supersede the SEC and NASD rules in acting to suspend
or revoke the registration of a Utah broker-dealer and NASD member. It does not say that
compliance with SEC and NASD rules and regulations under the Exchange Act creates a
basis upon which a broker-dealer or agent can be simultaneously subject to a state
revocation proceeding. The statute as in effect in 1989 stated but nine (9) grounds upon
which the Division may act to revoke a broker-dealer or agent's license, none of which are
remotely applicable to the interstate NASD conduct of Petitioners. To be sure, the statute
clearly does not say that unambiguous SEC and NASD rules, designed to facilitate trading of
securities in interstate commerce, can be capriciously deemed by the Division as "dishonest
or unethical practices". Ironically, had Petitioners deemed the Division's March 1, Summary
Order as superseding federal law — including Judge Greene's ruling — and thereby
preventing consummation of their out-of-state trades, and, as a result thereof, had
Petitioners ignored express Exchange Act obligations, Petitioners would have been accused
by the NASD and SEC of engaging in "dishonest or unethical practices." See 15 U.S.C.
§78o-3(b)(7).
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This point is underscored by Utah Code Ann. §61-1-24. which requires the
Division, with respect to rules, forms, and orders, to cooperate with the Securities and
Exchange Commission with the view to achieving maximum uniformity. [Emphasis
added.] Further. Utah Code Ann. §61-1-27. directly conflicts with the Division's position in
these proceedings. Section 61-1-27 provides:
This Chapter may be so construed as to effectuate its general
purpose as to make uniform the law of those states which enact
it and to coordinate the interpretation and administration of this
Chapter with the related federal regulation. [Emphasis added.]
Contrary to Utah Code Ann. §61-1-27. the Division's amended petitions are repugnant to
any "coordinating" of its interpretation and administration of §61-1-6 "with the related
federal regulation". Quite literally, it is impossible to imagine a set of circumstances under
which conduct by a state could be more conflicting with the federal regulatory scheme.
Surely, no respectable business person should be subjected to such conflicting regulation
— conflicting regulation the Division callously contends is simply Petitioners' "problem", not
government's.
In this case, the Division's amended petitions must be overturned and
dismissed because such petitions are clearly outside the Division's regulatory boundaries.
Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System v. Dimension Financial Corp.. 106 S. Ct. 681
(1986)(applying the "plain purpose" test to determine if agency is acting within its authority).
As the Supreme Court in Board of Governors put it:
"In determining whether the Board was empowered to make such
a change, we begin of course, with the language of the statute.
If the statute is clear and unambiguous (with regard to an
agency's authority), that is the end of the matter
"
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Id. at p. 685. In this case, there should be no ambiguity in statutory interpretation. Even a
"plain view" of Utah Code Ann. §61-1-6(1). evidences that the Division cannot take action to
discipline a broker-dealer or agent simply for honoring Exchange Act obligations. For this
reason, the ALJ's August 29. 1989. ruling is erroneous.
E. Because the August 29, 1989 Order "conflicts" with the rules and
regulations promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act, including §28(a) thereof, it is
preempted by federal law. Therefore, the Order of August 29 is erroneous and must be
reversed.
The Pre-emption Doctrine is an additional basis on which the Order of August
29 should be reversed. When Congress exercises a granted power, concurrent conflicting
state legislation may be challenged via the Preemption Doctrine. The Supremacy Clause,
Art. IV, CI. II. mandates that federal law overrides, i.e., preempts any state regulation where
there is an actual conflict between the two sets of legislation such that both cannot stand,
for example, if federal law forbids an act which state legislation requires or, the contrary
thereof, which exists in this case. In this case, federal law requires an act which not even
state legislation, but mere state agency interpretation allegedly forbids. Certainly, a more
concrete and offensively conspicuous example of when and where the Preemption Doctrine
applies could not exist.
In a leading Supreme Court preemption case, the Court stated that the test for
preemption is whether under the circumstances of a particular case, the state law "stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). The Constitutional principle is
simply that state and federal government should have a common end in view, namely, to
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avoid conflicting regulation of conduct by various official bodies which might have some
authority over the subject matter. Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Ry. & Motor
Coach Employees v. Lockridge. 403 U.S. 274 (1971). Where there is no indicia of
Congressional intent (i.e.. a "dormant" Commerce Clause issue), a court may have to balance
the state and federal interest to achieve this end. Such is not the case here. The August
29. Order fails to address or discuss Congressional intent in the area of interstate,
over-the-counter trading of securities and had the ALJ done so. he would have concluded
that there is clear, concise, and unambiguous legislative intent within the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. Schneiderwind v. ANR Pipeline Company. 108 S.Ct. 1145, 485 U.S.
293 (1988)(holding that a preemption question requires an examination of Congressional
intent and striking down a state statute under the commerce clause for impinging on a
federal regulatory scheme). Based merely on the preamble to the '34 Act quoted above,
there can be no dispute over Congress' intent. Nonetheless, the ALJ concluded that the
Division has subject-matter jurisdiction to regulate and discipline Petitioners in diametric
conflict therewith.
Subsequent U.S. Supreme Court cases have adopted a three prong inquiry to
establish pre-emption. They are generally:
(1)

The pervasiveness of the federal regulatory scheme;

(2)

The federal occupation of the field as necessitated by the
need for national uniformity;

(3)

The danger of conflict between states laws and the
administration of the federal program.

Pennsylvania v. Nelson. 350 U.S. 497, 502-505 (1956). The progeny of Hines and
Pennsylvania have continually narrowed the scope of judicial inquiry into a determination of
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whether, under the particular facts of the case, the existence of the state regulatory
scheme is facilitative or detrimental to the purposes and objectives of the federal statute.
In fact, most preemption cases discuss state legislation as possibly being in conflict or
inconsistent with the federal scheme, not, as in this case, unilateral, self-serving "state
action" 180 degrees in conflict with the federal regulatory scheme. Here, the Division has
revoked Petitioners' state registrations for their allegedly engaging in "dishonest and
unethical practices." At the same time, the NASD is mandated to secure compliance by its
members with the federal securities laws as well as its own regulations, which are
themselves designed to promote "ethical business behavior." 15 U.S.C. §78o-3(b)(7).
Petitioners1 conduct from a purely federal standpoint was indeed "ethical". How then, can
the very same conduct be deemed "unethical" from a state standpoint and yet there be no
"conflict" between the regulatory schemes?
Cooperation is also a two-way street. Thus, states may not, under the
Supremacy Clause, refuse to enforce valid federal laws even though such enforcement is in
state court. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 368 (1947). The only exception is if Congress expressly
or impliedly excuses a state from enforcing such federal law. See e.g., Douglas v. New York,
N.H. &H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377, 387-88 (1929). In this case, Congress has not excused the
Division or the State of Utah from enforcing SEC and NASD mandates; Congress has never
said a state can force its licenses to violate Art. Ill, §1, NASD Rules of Fair Practice. In fact,
one cannot imagine a greater, more poignant conflict between state and federal law: if
Petitioners comply with NASD and SEC rules they, according to the Division, engage in
"dishonest or unethical practices" yet, if they comply with the Division's unilateral
interpretation of its own "order," they violate SEC and NASD obligations, subjecting
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themselves to fine, suspension and expulsion from the brokerage business, let alone costly
litigation with every out-of-state entity to whom they owed stock and who would have
together had to effect $500,000 worth of "buy-ins" for the account of Johnson-Bowles.
Finally, the August 29, Order is repugnant to the mandate of comity as further articulated in
Art. IV, Sees. 1 and 2 of the federal Constitution. See e j . , Toomer v. Wltsell, 334 U.S. 385.
395-96(1948).
A discussion of pre-emption relative to the Exchange Act cannot be made
without reference to Edgar v. Mite, (U.S. Sup. Ct., June 23, 1982), 457 U.S. 624, 73 L.Ed.2
269, 102 S.Ct. 2629, [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 198,728. In Edgar, the
U.S. Supreme Court was confronted with the question of whether the Illinois Business
Takeover Act was unconstitutional under the Williams Act, a 1968 amendment to the
Exchange Act. After analyzing the protections afforded localities versus the burden
imposed by the state statute on interstate commerce, the Court concluded that the Illinois
statute was unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause and therefore preempted under
the Exchange Act. The Court held that the Commerce Clause precludes the application of a
state law to commerce that takes place outside a state's borders regardless of whether or
not such commerce has effects within the state. The state statute was thus declared
unconstitutional in that it imposed a burden on interstate commerce which was excessive in
light of the local interests the state statute was designed to further. Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 90 S.Ct. 844, 847-48 (1970)(where state statute regulates evenhandedly
to effectuate a legitimate local interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits). The Division's amended petitions serve
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no purpose for the benefit of Utah residents when compared to the burdens such actions
were calculated to impose on interstate commerce, namely, preventing each out-of-state
NASD member broker-dealer and a major clearing corporation, who were together owed
over 500,000 shares of U.S.A. Medical stock, from ever receiving either it or the money they
would have each spent to get it. In fact, the Division's amended petitions in no way serve to
protect anyone, let alone a Utah resident. If anything, Petitioners ensured that several
hundred thousand shares of U.S.A. Medical are no longer subject to being sold to Utah
residents as such shares have been "exported" out of Utah. Would the Division rather have
all such stock still sitting here in Utah waiting to be redistributed at some point to Utah
residents in violation of the Division's March 1, Order? If one balances the interest of this
locality in disciplining Petitioners as against the burden imposed on several out-of-state
broker-dealers and a major clearing corporation, one must conclude that the purely
speculative nature of protection afforded by the Division's disciplinary actions impose a
substantial burden on interstate commerce — a burden which far outweighs any local
putative benefit. Because the Division's actions seek to affect interstate commerce and
prohibit the facilitation of interstate securities transactions — transactions previously
undertaken and entered into by Petitioners with out-of-state residents — such action by
the Division can hardly be said to affect interstate commerce only incidentally. Edgar
v. Mite, supra. Furthermore, Edgar held that if a state law affects interstate securities
transactions, it violates the Exchange Act. The Division's actions are clearly atypical of
everyday Blue Sky regulation in that the Division has sought — after the fact — to directly
regulate specific interstate securities transactions that have already taken place across
state lines. There can also be no question that Petitioners' executory NASD contracts —
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for which their securities licenses have now been revoked — are interstate commerce.
[Emphasis added.]
The Petitioners are also being discriminated against as federal licensees and
NASD members merely because they are Utah residents. This kind of discrimination
characteristically invalidates a state law under the Commerce Clause because such state
action is based on impermissible protectionist intent or effect. See e.g., L.P. Acquisition Co.
v. Tyson, 772 F.2d 201 ['85 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) K92.271 at p. 91,876
(6th Cir. 1985). The only difference is that in this case we are taking of
"reverse-discrimination" which has no rational basis and serves to protect no one. more
especially, any Utah resident. On the contrary, the Division's form-over-substance
protectionism harms Petitioners who are themselves Utah residents. The question is: don't
Petitioners, as Utah residents, count for anything?
In sum, the Supreme Court has made no suggestion that §28(a), the savings
provision in the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. §78bb(a)(1982)], authorizes, in anyway, state
violations of the Commerce Clause. Edgar, supra. In Public Utilities Commission v. United
Fuel Gas Co., 317 U.S. 456, 467, 63 S.Ct. 369, 87 L. Ed. 396 (1943), the U.S. Supreme Court
upheld an injunction against a state on the ground that a supplier suffered injury from
enforcement of a state's order which "confused [state and federal] functions". In other
words, compliance with such [state] orders is among the contingencies against which
Congress sought to guard against in creating exclusive federal jurisdiction. [Emphasis
added.] Id.
The Division's only argument is that the instant proceedings fall within its
"legitimate police power". On the contrary, it well settled in Utah that the mere declaration
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by the legislature — not a mere agency — that an act is within the exercise of its police
power is not binding on courts unless the act is specifically within the scope of such power.
Utah Manufacturers' Assn. v. Stewart, 82 U. 198, 23 P.2d 229, 235-236 (Utah 1933). In
addition, Art. I, Sec. 18 of the Utah Constitution prevents a state from "impairing the
obligation of contracts". While the Division argues in this case that impairing Petitioners'
outstanding interstate brokerage contracts is within its police power, such is not true. No
Utahns have been damaged in any respect by the conduct of Petitioners and under Utah law
the Division's right to impair contracts is subject to such reasonable policing regulations as
may be enacted to promote the public good. Golding v. Shubach Optical Co., 93 U. 32, 70
P.2d 871, 875 (Utah 1937)(A statute purporting to charge or limit the right of contract in the
public interest must expressly declare such charge or limitation or it must be reasonably
implied from the language used.). Saying it another way, no "public good" is possibly served
by putting Petitioners out-of-business merely for fulfilling their obligations as NASD
members. On the other hand, surely it is not the Division's position that it is compelled to
discipline Petitioners to protect them from themselves as in the case of jay-walking — a
crime within a state's police power for that very reason.
While the Division maintains that its amended petitions are within the exercise
of its police power delegated to it by Utah legislature, such is not binding on courts unless
the act is specifically within the scope of the law's general purpose. Utah Manufacturers'
Assn.. supra at p. 235-36 (the legislature may not delegate powers to executive officers).
Since the Division can show no legitimate purpose behind the administrative proceedings
below other than flexing its own regulatory muscles, the amended petitions serve no
legitimate purpose within the Division's power or authority.
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Based on the foregoing, the August 29, Order skirts the entire issue of
pre-emption and comity, ignoring the Exchange Act and Supremacy and Commerce Clauses
in their entirety, and erroneously concludes that regulation designed to frustrate federal
rules and regulation and otherwise seriously damage several out-of-state residents is
within the legitimate police power of the Division when it is not. Accordingly, the August 29,
Order must be reversed and vacated under Rule 12(b)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
3. FORMER DIVISION DIRECTOR JOHN C. BALDWIN'S OCTOBER 30. 1989,
ORDER ON AGENCY REVIEW DENYING ANY ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE
ALJ'S AUGUST 29, 1989, ORDER IS ERRONEOUS AND HAS PREJUDICED PETITIONERS. (Ex.
Q; R. 296-300.)
This order is the subject of a related appeal before this Court, Case No.
900210-CA and thus, Petitioners will not be addressing the same herein. It would also be
repetitive of the foregoing discussion. Reference is thus made to the briefs of Petitioners
and the Division on file herein relative to such appeal.
4. THE ALJ'S DECEMBER 18, 1989, ORDER DENYING PETITIONERS' MOTION TO
DISMISS THE DIVISION'S AMENDED PETITIONS UNDER RULE 12(b)(6), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM IS ERRONEOUS AND MUST BE REVERSED.
(Ex. T; R. 665-672.)
A. The amended petitions are unconstitutional under the due process clauses
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The Division unilaterally interprets its Summary Order as prohibiting
"purchases" of U.S.A. Medical stock for any purpose and that such somehow constitutes a
violation of Utah Code Ann. §61-1-6(1 )(g) and the rules promulgated thereunder. The very
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language of the Order itself says nothing at all of "purchases". Further, nothing in the
Order, the Utah Uniform Securities Act, or Petitioners' industry training and education
indicates that such Order could be (or would be) interpreted to designate "purchases" of
U.S.A. Medical stock after March 1, 1989. as in any way "dishonest or unethical", let alone as
a dishonest or unethical "practice". (See Brewster, infra.) Petitioners thus had no notice
that their ministerial and perfunctory purchases and out-of-state delivery of such
securities after March 1, 1989, could have or would have resulted in any administrative
adjudicative proceeding. They also had no opportunity to be heard in this regard, especially
when the Division, having been present at the Judge Greene preliminary injunction hearing,
knew full well that Petitioners had no choice but to purchase stock to fulfill their federal
obligations.20
The Division should also have proceeded in its theory of liability by advance
rulemaking as opposed to adjudication. The Division's failure to choose rulemaking in this
case over adjudication or to otherwise give Petitioners any notice of how it would
unilaterally and self-servingly interpret its own Summary Order is inherently unfair and
violates Petitioners' right of substantive and procedural due process. In short, the Division
abused its discretion in choosing order, or even administrative adjudicative proceeding,
rather than rule. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974). See, e.g.. Bernstein, The
NLRB's Adjudication-Rule Dilemma Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 79 Yale L.J. 571
(1970).
A property interest can be conferred by the federal government. Gonzalez
v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964)(due process is involved in the suspension of a

^ P e t i t i o n e r s also had no notice that the Division would attempt to make the Summary Order
"permanent" under Utah Code Ann. §61-1-14(3).
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company's right to enter into federal contracts.) In this case, several persons including
Petitioners, had federal property rights in the outstanding NASD contracts. The Division's
actions to unlawfully interfere with such federal contracts — be it after such contracts
were fulfilled or not — violate due process.
For the above reasons, the amended petitions are unconstitutional and fail to
state a claim.
B. The amended petitions violate Petitioners' equal protection guarantees.
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment entitles Petitioners to equal
protection of the law. It is undisputed that several local broker-dealers and other
individuals, with the exception of Petitioners, traded, sold, and fulfilled contracts in the
securities of U.S.A. Medical after having actual knowledge of Judge Greene's and the
Division's Order. Yet there is no evidence of any contemporary or consistent disciplinary
action taken by the Division with respect to them, including local broker-dealers R.A.
Johnson and P.B. Jameson who directly violated the Division's Summary Order. (See *32,
Stmt, of Facts above.) As federal licensees and NASD members, Petitioners are entitled to
be treated the same as every other such licensee.
The Fourteenth Amendment commands that individuals be treated in a manner
similar to others as an independent constitutional guarantee. This guarantee governs all
governmental actions which classify individuals for different benefits or burdens under the
law. To single-out and give its Summary Order a predatory and discriminatory effect on
Petitioners under the circumstances of this case is not treating Petitioners equally. As U.S.
citizens, Petitioners are to be accorded equal and fair treatment in the exercise of
fundamental rights or, they are entitled to the elimination of distinctions based on
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impermissible criteria. Because the Division has not enforced its order evenhandedly, let
alone against those who directly violated it by "selling" stock, the amended petitions violate
Petitioners' equal protection guarantees.
On August 9, 1989, the Division issued a secret and private No-Action letter to
a Utah licensed securities broker named Susan Slattery, authorizing her to execute
"directed trades" in the securities of U.S.A. Medical provided neither the buyer nor the seller
were Utah residents. (Ex. S; R. 440, 229, 1146; 129, Stmt, of Facts above.) While the
Division's Summary Order acknowledges (and publicizes) that U.S.A. Medical is a fraud and
that its stock is "bad stock", the Division takes the simultaneous position that a licensed
Utah securities agent can still transact in the securities of U.S.A. Medical. In short, the
Division has disciplined Petitioners for buying U.S.A. Medical stock to complete federal
executory contracts yet, at the same time, a local securities agent can deal — from Utah!
— in U.S.A. Medical's securities knowing U.S.A. Medical is a complete, unadulterated fraud.
Thus, so long as Susan Slattery defrauds someone who is not a Utah resident, such is
perfectly acceptable to the Division and not inconsistent with the amended petitions (which,
by the way, have nothing to do with "fraud" on the part of Petitioners). This is but further
evidence of why the amended petitions violate Petitioners' right of equal protection.
C. The amended petitions violate the privileges and immunities of Petitioners
as United States citizens and federal licensees.
Under Art. IV, §2 and §1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution,
Petitioners are entitled to all of the privileges and immunities reserved to American citizens.
This merely means that a state may limit rights so long as they don't affect federal rights.
The subject administrative adjudicative proceedings are merely the enforcement of state
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"law" which abridges the privileges and immunities guaranteed Petitioners as citizens (and
federal licensees) of these United States. As NASD members and federal licensees,
Petitioners have the right to be treated the same as other in state and out-of-state NASD
member broker-dealers and in a manner consistent with the Exchange Act. Accordingly,
such proceedings are unconstitutional.
D. The amended petitions violate the mandate of comity in both the
Constitution and the Utah Uniform Securities Act.
Article IV, §§1 and 2 of the Constitution mandate comity or cooperation
between federal and state governments. For instance, as set forth above, a state must
regulate consistently and in cooperation and harmonization with federal securities law. See
Utah Code Ann. §§61-1-24 and 27, including §28(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934 and, §1904, which taken together with §514 of the Uniform Securities Act, have both
been adopted in Utah. Because the subject amended petitions are repugnant to the
constitutional principles of comity and the express mandate of Utah Code Ann. §61-1-27,
such petitions are unconstitutional and fail to state a claim.
E. The amended petitions are unconstitutional because they have the effect of
an ex post facto law.
Article I, §10, CI. 1 of the Constitution prohibits a state from passing or
enforcing an ex post facto law which is defined as a law making an act illegal after the act
was performed or undertaken. Prior to April 27, 1989, the date of the Division's initial
petitions, there was nothing illegal or "dishonest or unethical" about purchasing securities,
either in and of itself or by way of the Division's March 1, Summary Order. However, on April
27, 1989, after the conduct of Petitioners in issue, the Division unilaterally interpreted its
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Summary Order as "illegalizing" Petitioners' pre-April 27, conduct. The amended petitions
thus have the operative effect of an ex post facto law. This is further prohibited under Art.
I, §18 of the Constitution of Utah. Retail, Wholesale & Dept. Store Union v. NLRB, 499 F.2d
846 (2d Cir. 1971); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Doe, 647 F.2d 142 (Em. Ct. App. 1981). Accordingly,
the amended petitions are unconstitutional and the ALJ's December Order should be
reversed.
F. The amended petitions violate Petitioners' Constitution right to be free
from contractual interference by a State.
Article I, §10, cl. 1 of the Constitution prohibits a state from impairing a
contractual obligation. The same prohibition is contained in Art. I, §18 of the Utah
Constitution. The Division's amended petitions were knowingly designed to impair
Petitioners' executory contractual obligations incurred in interstate commerce as
contemplated under the Exchange Act. Since the Division's action is in direct and diametric
conflict with Petitioners' Exchange Act obligations, no argument can be made that such
petitions do not impair and disrupt such interstate executory contracts. Accordingly, the
amended petitions are unconstitutional and fail to state a claim.
G. Utah Code Ann. §61-1-6(1 )(g), and R177-1-6g as applied in this case are
constitutionally "void for vagueness".
Utah Code Ann. §61-1-6(1 )(g), and the Division's rules promulgated thereunder
empower the Division to revoke the registration of a broker-dealer or agent for "dishonest
or unethical practices". (Ex. A and B.) It is not clear to a reasonably intelligent person that
the conduct in this case would be or could be deemed a "dishonest or unethical practice",
nor did Petitioners have notice that their conduct could be and would be unilaterally
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deemed by the Division as violative of §61-1-6(1 )(g) and the rule of the Division promulgated
thereunder. This is particularly true when R177-6-1 g is, by it own language, patterned
after Art. Ill, §1 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice, the rules of the SEC, and NASAA
Guidelines. (See 1119, Stmt, of Facts above.)
At the hearing on Petitioners' Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss, Petitioners
provided the ALJ with a copy of the NASAA Guidelines defining "dishonest or unethical
practices". (Ex. 0; R. 58-60.) A review of such Guidelines, which the Division has every
obligation to follow based on the Preliminary Notes to R177-6-1 g, say nothing of
purchasing securities nor do they say anything of prohibiting the purchase of securities to
complete outstanding Exchange Act obligations undertaken in ordinary interstate securities
transactions. The same can be said of R177-6-1 g itself, as effective, 1989. In fact, what is
even more remarkable is that 111401 of the NASAA Guidelines are the exact same language
as Art. Ill, §1 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice. In other words, the Division has interpreted
the very same guideline with the exact same language contrary to the NASD itself. For
instance, the NASD interprets not honoring trades as "dishonest or unethical" whereas the
Division interprets honoring trades in the exact same context as "dishonest or unethical."
The problem is: how can the same conduct be both "honest or ethical" and "dishonest or
unethical" at the same time and the applicable guidelines, rules, or statute not be
ambiguous and vague? It is thus peculiar that guidelines specifically designed by various
regulatory authorities to encourage "honest or ethical practices" are simultaneously
interpreted by the Division as "dishonest or unethical practices". In short, if the Division
can't interpret NASAA Guidelines or its own R177-6-1 g consistently with identical federal
law and NASAA Guidelines, how can a reasonably intelligent person (who is regulated by
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both) be expected to know, in advance, what he can and will be charged with by the
Division?
Because Utah Code Ann. §61-1-6(1 )(g) and the rules promulgated thereunder
are vague and ambiguous in their application to this case and otherwise do not curb
unfettered Division discretion, such statute and the rules promulgated thereunder are
constitutionally void for vagueness. In Boyce Motor Line, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337
(1952), the dissenters insisted that the regulation under review was excessively vague and
that it is in the public interest and the interests of justice "to pronounce this vague
regulation invalid." Id. at 343-46. The Seventh Circuit has held a state university regulation
authorizing sanctions for "misconduct" void in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's due
process clause. Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978 (E.D. Wis. 1968), aff'd, 418 F.2d 163,
166 (7th Cir. 1969)(statute void because of non-existent or unconstitutionally vague
standards). Soglin involved the existence of a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and
improper application. Similarly, with respect to this case, a recent Maryland case discussing
"dishonest and unethical practices" in the brokerage business is easily distinguishable. In
Brewster v. Maryland Securities Commissioner, (Maryland Ct. of Special Appeals, October 6,
1988), 76 Md. App. 722, 548 A.2d 157, ['88-'90 Transfer Binder], Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH)
f72,906, cert, den. 109 U.S. 2449 (Jan. 11, 1989), the Court held that the absence from the
Maryland Securities Act of a definition of "dishonest and unethical practices" did not
preclude punishment of a securities agent who "encouraged" her customer to falsify his net
worth in order to facilitate approval of trading in his account by the agent's brokerage firm
employer. The Court held that the phrase "dishonest and unethical" was well defined in both
the NASD's rules and the agent's employee compliance manual and that the Maryland Act
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should be read in conjunction with these sources. Since the agent was familiar with and had
passed a comprehensive examination on NASD rules and regulations, she was expected to
be aware of the norms in her industry. Thus, the Court found that the Maryland Act was not
ambiguous, and that the securities agent knew or should have known that the particular sale
to her customer and the deception she had him practice with respect to his net worth was
misleading and dishonest. [Emphasis added.] Accordingly, the decision that the suspension
of the agent's registration was not an unconstitutional deprivation of her securities license
was affirmed. The case at bar is nothing like Brewster and demonstrates that the
"dishonest or unethical practice" prohibition is designed to regulate "sales" by brokers and
dishonest conduct relative thereto which can harm customers and the investing public. On
the contrary, Petitioners conduct had nothing to do with the "public" and there is nothing in
any examinations that Petitioners have had to take which put them on notice that
"purchasing" stock to complete federal executory contracts is in any way a "dishonest or
unethical practice". For this and the reasons above, Utah Code Ann. §61-1-6(1 )(g) and
R177-6-1 g as applied to Petitioners in this case are constitutionally vague and ambiguous.
H. The amended petitions fail to state a claim because Petitioners' conduct
was neither "dishonest or unethical" nor a "dishonest or unethical practice" as a matter of
law.
The amended petitions allege that Petitioners engaged in "dishonest or
unethical practices". To understand these allegations, an examination of the very words at
stake is informative. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language defines
"dishonest" as:
1.

Disposed to lie, cheat, defraud, or deceive.

2.

Proceeding from, gained by, or betokening falseness.
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The American Heritage Dictionary does not define "unethical" but defines "ethical" as "Of,
pertaining to, or dealing with ethics." It further defines "ethics" as:
1 .a.

The study of the general nature of morals and of the
specific moral choices to be made by the individual in his
relationship with others; the philosophy of morals. Also
called "moral philosophy."

1 .b.

The moral sciences as a whole, including moral philosophy
and customary, civil, and religious law.

2.

Any set for moral principles or values.

3.

The moral quality of a course of action; fitness; propriety.

Petitioners1 conduct was entirely open and above-board; nothing was secretive,
clandestine, or deceptive or morally wrong; no one was mislead; no one did not receive full
disclosure; no one was lied to; no one was cheated; no one was defrauded or swindled; no
one was harmed or damaged. Further, none of those individuals who sold their U.S.A.
Medical stock to Petitioners for purposes of completing interstate securities transactions
have complained that they have been defrauded or cheated by Petitioners, nor have they
claimed that Petitioners' conduct was in any way deceitful or immoral, and Petitioners have
never been notified that any of such individuals want or desire their worthless stock back in
exchange for Petitioners' money. In fact, what occurred is really none of the Division's
business. Conversely, certainly it is not the Division's position that Petitioners cheated or
defrauded themselves as purchasers. In short, because the Division cannot point to one
single, solitary Utah resident or any other person who has been or could have been
damaged or harmed in any way by the conduct of Petitioners, the Division has no standing
to complain that Petitioners' conduct was "dishonest or unethical". Certainly, such terms,
being adjectives, require a recipient or object of some kind as in Brewster supra. In this
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case there are none. The amended petitions thus miserably fail to achieve a legitimate
governmental purpose and are otherwise not "in the public interest" as alleged in Ts 14 and
24 of the amended petitions.
The second part of the applicable statute and rules promulgated thereunder
requires a "practice". There is no evidence that this particular, isolated conduct of
Petitioners on but one occasion pertaining to but one particular security is in any way a
common business "practice" of Petitioners. Surely the Petitioners are not looking forward
to spending another hundred thousand dollars in attorney's fees and costs as they have in
the Judge Greene litigation merely to possibly buy stock once again at a price lower than
they sold it. This is what the Division would have one believe, however, assuming such
conduct is indeed a "practice". In fact, the word "practice" contemplates something
occurring (or potentially occurring) in the regular and ordinary course of business.
Certainly that is not what is involved here. What is deemed an "unethical or dishonest
practice" is contained in the NASD Rules of Fair Practice and the NASAA Guidelines. (See
Petitioners' Expert Testimony, Ex. DD.) It is on the basis of these Guidelines that R177-6-1 g
is "patterned" and which determines the scope of Utah Code Ann. §61 -1 -6(1 )(g). Such
practices include but are not limited to a broker undertaking excessive mark-ups (i.e.,
"scalping") and otherwise not making proper disclosure on confirmations to customers; in
other words, violations of Sections 9, 10, and 15 of the Exchange Act and the rules
promulgated by the SEC thereunder. These are the types of activities that are unethical and
dishonest practices as they ultimately work a fraud on the public. (See Ex. KK.) There is no
evidence that Petitioners' conduct worked a fraud or even could have worked a fraud on
anyone. Because the amended petitions are grounded solely upon speculation, not reality,
the amended petitions fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
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I. The amended petitions fail to state a claim because the Division failed to
comply with Utah Code Ann. §61-1-14(3), as effective 1989. (Ex. C)
Under Utah Code Ann. §61-1-14(3), as effective 1989, the Division's Summary
Order was only valid for ten (10) days. In fact, all of Petitioners' purchases occurred after
March 10, 1989. Thus, there is nothing actionable, directly or indirectly, against Petitioners
by virtue of an order which no longer existed.
In addition, a so-called "permanent order" under §14(3) couldn't have been
made on the heels of a summary order which didn't exist and had expired. Furthermore, a
"permanent order" cannot be made so by "default" — including "findings" by default —
without notice, a hearing, and an opportunity to be heard by all affected by the order.
There is no evidence that Petitioners had notice that the Division would seek to make its
so-called Summary Order permanent by "default." Because the Division failed to follow
§14(3), its amended petitions fail to state a claim.
J. The amended petitions fail to state a claim because the Division
misinterpreted the statute and its own Summary Order.
The linchpin of the Division's amended petitions are that the March 1, Summary
Order somehow "prohibited" purchases of U.S.A. Medical stock, let alone more than 10 days
thereafter. Clearly, nothing in either state or federal law requires registration by anyone to
undertake purchases of securities nor is there any law anywhere which requires an
exemption of any kind for purchasing securities.21 gy the very language and title of the

^1As set forth in the Statement of Facts above, no exemption 1s or ever has been required under
state or federal securities laws to "purchase" stock. This 1s why the Division amended its
initial defective petitions in July 1989, to delete an admittedly unsupportable claim that
Petitioners, by simply "purchasing1' non-exempt stock, directly violated the Division's March 1,
1989, Summary Order suspending all |14(2) exemptions. The only possible exception to the
foregoing is Exchange Act Rule 10b-6 which requires an exemption for purchases by an underwriter
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March Summary Order, only the offer or sale of U.S.A. Medical stock was thereafter
prohibited. In fact, the Order was never intended to proscribe purchases. Since neither the
Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, nor the Utah Uniform
Securities Act requires registration or an exemption for mere "purchases", Petitioners'
conduct in simply purchasing stock "privately" is not actionable either directly or by way of
baldfaced, conclusory "opinion" that such conduct is a "dishonest or unethical practice".
Congress has simply declined to delegate authority to either the SEC or the Division,
through the Utah legislature or otherwise, to prohibit purchases of stock for any reason. In
fact, in this case, the purchases in issue were entirely "private"; they were not "trading"
transactions effected on any "market". Thus, Count I of the amended petitions
misinterprets the law and therefore, it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. (See e.g., Dickerson, Reed. The Interpretation and Application of Statutes,
Chapter 8, "Basic Concepts: Legislative Purpose", Little, Brown & Co., Boston (1975), pp.
87-102.)
K. As a matter of law, allegations that Petitioners, as mere purchasers, "aided
[and abetted]" or "participated" in the alleged non-exempt sale thereof is not actionable,
and therefore, Count I of the amended petitions fails to state a claim.
Count I of the amended petitions alleges that Petitioners "participated" in the
allegedly unlawful sales of securities to themselves. In other words, Petitioners allegedly
"aided [and abetted]" their own purchases merely because of their status as "purchasers".
(Ex. L;R. 161-168.)

during its simultaneous underwriting and distribution. This rule is wholly inapplicable to these
proceedings as Johnson-Bowles was neither doing an underwriting of U.S.A. Medical's securities
nor was i t purchasing them at the same time during any initial distribution thereof.
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The Division's novel concept of liability is remarkable in light of the aiding and
abetting theory of liability applicable to securities law. Aiding and abetting is a judicially
created doctrine of secondary liability in private civil suits which is not explicitly found in the
securities laws. [Emphasis added.] The Supreme Court's continued use of the
"contemporary legal context" analysis in Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375
(1983), and Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982), supports
the legitimacy of aiding and abetting liability in private civil suits since the aiding and
abetting theory of liability was well established among the circuits when Congress amended
the 1934 Act in 1975, and no action has ever been taken to repudiate it, thus resulting in a
ratification. In the Utah U.S. District Court case of Dahl v. Gardner, 583 F. Supp. 1262, 1267
(D. Utah 1984), U.S. District Court Judge Winder held that the principle that an aider and
abettor may be liable for securities fraud in private litigation has been established by judicial
interpretation. See Brunelle, "A Contemporary Legal Context of Aiding and Abetting," 11
Sec. Reg. L. J. 1982 (1983). The existing proceedings are not private litigation by a
defrauded purchaser to pursue Petitioners as prospective "deep pocket" defendant/sellers.
Further, Petitioners were never charged with an underlying crime which could conceivably
trigger aiding and abetting liability. See 18 U.S.C. §2. For instance, criminal aiding and
abetting requires, along with it, a substantive crime such as mail or wire fraud. See 18
U.S.C. §§1341 and 1343. Because Petitioners have not been charged with a substantive
crime and were not "found" guilty of any substantive crime, aiding and abetting liability as
alleged by the Division in this case is utter nonsense.
The significant language of Count I of the amended petitions appears to be
"encouragement" or "aiding" of violations of Utah Code Ann. §61-1-7. Regardless of the
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fact that, on July 16, 1990, the Division failed to "prove" that Petitioners' sellers violated
Utah Code Ann. §61-1-7, the amended petitions are blatantly defective in their allegations
of "aiding [and abetting]" liability. For instance, all aiding and abetting cases require a
fraudulent scheme as contemplated in Rule 10b-5, namely, an independent tort, not as in
this case, alleged strict liability (on the part of Petitioners' sellers). See e.g., Kerbs v. Fall
River Industries, Inc., 502 F.2d 731, 740-741 (10th Cir. 1974)(setting forth the elements of
aiding and abetting in the context of securities). In this case, Petitioners are not charged
with being parties to or aiding and abetting the underlying U.S.A. Medical stock fraud and
"short squeeze" as exclusively uncovered by them in Judge Greene's Court. In this case, the
only alleged illegality is that of Petitioners' sellers who allegedly sold Petitioners stock of
U.S.A. Medical without alleged Utah exemptions. While it was never proved on July 16, 1990,
that Petitioners' sellers lacked exemptions, it is undisputed that such people did so with full
knowledge of precisely what they were doing. Nonetheless, selling stock in violation of
§12(1) of the '33 Act or Utah Code Ann. §61-1-7, is a strict liability offense. It is not a tort.
Section 61-1-7 is Utah's counterpart to Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933. Utah Code
Ann. §61-1-22(1 )(a), 22 as in effect in 1989, is the state counterpart to §12(1) of the '33
Act. Both sections of both acts are strict liability offenses which entitle the buyer to
automatic rescission against his or her seller for selling a stock that was neither registered
nor for which there was an appropriate exemption. Count I of the Division's amended
petitions alleges no more than a violation by Petitioners' sellers of Utah Code
Ann. §61-1-22(1 )(a). The point here is that the Division is construing §61-1-22(1 )(a) in a

zz

Utah Code Ann. f61-1-22(1)(a) and (b), the Utah corollaries to §12(1) and §12(2) of the
SecurTties~7tatHof 1933, respectively, were amended effective April 23, 1990, as simply
61-1-22(1). However, such amendment 1s not retroactive
and therefore, 1t does not pertain to
hese proceedings. See Exs. D and F in Petitioners1 Addendum.
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manner which enables it to prosecute the purchaser when, in reality, §61-1-22(1 )(a) is a
purchaser and only a purchaser's cause of action. In other words, the purpose of
§61-1-22(1 )(a) is to protect purchasers not prosecute them as joint tortfeasors. [Emphasis
added.] Further, since a violation of §5 of the '33 Act or §61-1-7 of the Utah Act are strict
liability offenses, it would appear legally impossible that a person can "aid [and abet]" it.
Common examples of strict liability offenses are bigamy and statutory rape. Intent and
scienter are irrelevant just as they are with violations of §5 and §61-1-7. Either the
instrument in issue was a "security" or it was not; either it was "registered" or it was not;
either it was "exempt" or it was not; either it was "sold" or it was not. Since aiding and
abetting requires not only intent, substantial knowing participation, and scienter and,
because it also requires a fraudulent scheme or deceptive device or contrivance, namely, a
tort, Count I miserably fails to state a claim against Petitioners any more than the victim can
be guilty of aiding and abetting bigamy or statutory rape. If the performance of an abortion
is illegal, what the Division has done is prosecute the woman who has sought it, not the
doctor who performed it and who is the express target of the statute. State v. Fertig, 233
P.2d 347 (Utah 1951) and State v. Cragun, 38 P.2d 1071 (Utah 1934)(both holding that in
Utah a woman cannot aid and abet in the illegal performance of an abortion on herself
unless she in fact does it to herself). The crux of this case is simply that there has been a
failure on the part of the Division to conceptually distinguish the victim from the
perpetrator.
Because aiding and abetting is a tort theory of liability designed to protect a
purchaser, not a seller, from securities fraud and because Petitioners have not been injured
by their own purchases in issue, and, further, when nothing alleged against Petitioners
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involves fraud or any other tort, Count I abjectly fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted. Securities laws exist only to protect purchasers and because Petitioners have
neither been harmed nor defrauded by their sellers, Count I fails to state a claim. A Utah
Supreme Court case is directly on point: Schvanavelt v. Noy-Burn Milling & Processing
Corporation, 347 P.2d 553, 554 (Utah 1959)(The Securities Act was enacted to impose a
penalty upon the seller, and not upon the purchaser, where stock is sold without compliance
with its provisions, and a purchaser should not ordinarily be held in pari delicto with the
seller unless equally culpable); Accord: G.A. Thompson v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945, 962-63
(5th Cir. 1981). The amended petitions thus fail to state a claim under an aiding and
abetting theory.
L. The Division has no power or statutory authority to summarily suspend all
§14(2) exemptions for more than 10 days. Further, to suspend exemptions in perpetuity is
an unconstitutional "taking" without due process. Thus, after March 10, 1989, whatever
Petitioners (or their sellers) did was not actionable.
Nothing in Utah law confers power or authority on the Division or anyone else
to gratuitously suspend al] exemptions from registration under Utah Code Ann. §61-1-14(2)
forever. In fact, not even the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has power or
authority to suspend all §4 exemptions from registration under the securities laws. See
Sections 12(j) and §12(k) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. (Ex. G.) In fact, it is plainly
unlawful for the SEC to combine successive or back-to-back 10 day suspensions in order
to suspend trading in a security for more than 10 days. Sloan v. SEC, (CA-2, 1976) 547 F.2d
152, [ 7 6 - 7 7 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 195,757, mod'g (CA-2, 1975), 527
F.2d 11. Furthermore, under federal law, only the President of the United States may
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suspend trading in a security for more than 10 days. (See §12(k), Exchange Act.)
Significantly, the Utah Supreme Court has held that states rely on federal law to interpret
their own Blue Sky Laws. Payable Accounting Corp. v. McKinley, 667 P.2d 15, 17 (Utah
1983). If the SEC, which has been given Congressional authority to exclusively regulate
securities trading in interstate commerce, cannot suspend trading (i.e., but one particular
exemption) for more than 10 days, where does the Division get its authority to suspend all
exemptions in perpetuity?
To suspend exemptions beyond 10 days is an unconstitutional taking without
due process because it prevents those who have acquired a security from disposing of it.
The idea is perhaps most analogous to a TRO which can never be extended for successive
10 day periods. The inherent ludicrousness of "permanent suspension" (even of mere
"trading") is exemplified by the following example: assume the State of New York suspended
trading in IBM forever, let alone beyond 10 days. Would such conduct be fair to its
thousands and thousands of shareholders who would not be able to dispose of their
securities on the New York Stock Exchange?
Based on the fact that any such authority is unconstitutional, the Division's
March, 1989, Orders cannot have prohibited Petitioners from having purchased stock from
anyone after March 10, 1989. For the above reasons, Count I of the amended petitions
exceeds the Division's statutory authority and they are otherwise unconstitutional.
M. The Division's regulatory posture relative to the securities of U.S.A. Medical
after the date of its amended petitions is inconsistent with such petitions. Thus, they fail to
state a claim by the Division's own subsequent policy and conduct.
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Petitioners argued below in their Memorandum in Support of their Rule 12(b)(6)
Motion to Dismiss that the Division's secret and private No-Action letter of August 9, 1989
(Ex. S) — a policy allowing a licensed Utah securities agent to "direct trades" in the
securities of U.S.A. Medical — is legally inconsistent with the posture of the Division in its
amended petitions. This argument is further bolstered by the Division's September 1, 1989,
Press Release relative to U.S.A. Medical. (Ex. X; R. 716.) In such Press Release, the Division
notifies the world that it will rescind its March 1989, Orders once U.S.A. Medical has filed a
registration statement with the Division. This means that whatever problems the Summary
Order was designed to redress, "registration" will solve them (as far as the Division is
concerned). Nonetheless, neither Petitioners nor those out-of-state NASD broker-dealers
and clearing corporations to whom Johnson-Bowles owed stock, needed the protections
afforded by registration. To be sure, as parties, they were all present in Judge Greene's
Court when everything concerning U.S.A. Medical was exposed. Simply put, by March 1,
1989, everyone affected by Johnson-Bowies' "short" (namely everyone in the Judge Greene
litigation) already knew everything that anyone would want to know or that would otherwise
be disclosed in a registration statement. In fact, none of such parties who obtained the
stock strictly for "delivery" were in the least concerned whether the stock was registered or
not. In short, registration is only to protect prospective innocent and unsophisticated
purchasers, not fully informed, sophisticated NASD member broker-dealers and clearing
agents and corporations. SEC v. Ralston Purina Company, 346 U.S. 119 (1953)(holding that
securities laws do not apply to persons who do not need the protections afforded by
registration). Since registration is something that would have admittedly made the March
1989, Orders obsolete or wholly unnecessary, it is clear that Petitioners did nothing wrong,
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let alone "dishonest or unethical" by purchasing stock to "flatten-out" their pre-existing
federal executory contracts. Because registration has and would have no bearing on
Petitioners' conduct from a legal, or even moral, standpoint, the amended petitions are
legally inconsistent with the Division's avowed policy enunciated in both its August 9,
No-Action Letter and its September 1, 1989, Press Release. Based on such regulatory
inconsistencies, the amended petitions fail to state a claim.
N. There must be damage or even the prospect or potential of damage to the
public before a broker-dealer or agent's registration with the Division can be revoked at all,
let alone for one year. Because Petitioners acted at all times in good faith and their
conduct lacked any possibility of ever damaging anyone (and, on the contrary, both
frustrated the fraud and protected those to whom Petitioners owed stock), the amended
petitions do not achieve a legitimate state governmental purpose. Because they are not in
the "public interest", they fail to state a claim.
There is no dispute that Petitioners' conduct damaged no one. There is also
no dispute that Petitioners' conduct never could have potentially damaged anyone.
Moreover, there is no dispute that Petitioners' conduct saved several NASD member
broker-dealers and at least one clearing corporation from losing hundreds of thousands of
dollars effecting "buy-ins" for which none of them ever could have ever been reimbursed or
paid. Furthermore, the stock that such entities would have purchased "on the market" to
effect "buy-ins" would have come from the "control persons" and criminals who
orchestrated the "short squeeze" in the first place. Thus, Petitioners' conduct prevented
hundreds of thousands of dollars from being placed in the pockets of the criminals who in
fact orchestrated the fraud from the beginning. Instead of being put out-of-business,
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Petitioners should be commended for doing the Division's work for it and preventing the
U.S.A. Medical criminals from reaping the unlawful fruits of their crimes. In fact, as
opposed to injuring anyone, Petitioners ensured that other Utah residents wouldn't be
damaged by the U.S.A. Medical fraud. Based on the fact that Petitioners were victims, not
wrongdoers, who at all times acted in good faith, coupled with the fact that Petitioners, as
"whistleblowers", single-handedly exposed the U.S.A. Medical fraud, the Division's amended
petitions designed solely to penalize them for doing what the Division and the SEC were
designed to do, fail to state a claim. (See SEC v. Dirks footnote 15, supra.) This point is
supported by Buchman v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 553 F.2d 816, 821 (2nd Cir.
1977). In Buchman, a case involving the violation of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice by a
broker, the Second Circuit stated:
The touchstone, in other words, is good faith — the ultimate
test of violation of an ethical standard . . . . The measure of
culpability then becomes whether appellants were in good faith.
Because Petitioners acted reasonably and in good faith and there is no evidence to the
contrary, Count I of the amended petitions fails to state a claim.
5. THE ALJ'S MARCH 23, 1990, ORDER DENYING PETITIONERS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 56, UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, IS REVERSIBLE
ERROR. (Ex. AA; R. 597-608.) THIS IS BECAUSE THERE WAS NO ISSUE OF FACT AS TO
WHETHER PETITIONERS ENGAGED IN SO-CALLED "DISHONEST OR UNETHICAL PRACTICES"
AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE AMENDED PETITIONS SHOULD HAVE BEEN
GRANTED.
Count I of the amended petitions alleges that Petitioners (not merely Petitioner
Johnson) "solicited", "encouraged", or "aided" Petitioner Johnson's sellers in selling their
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U.S.A. Medical stock to him. There was no evidence of this at the summary judgment level
and in fact, such was contradicted by the affidavits submitted by Petitioners and their
sellers in support of this motion. (Exs. U, V, W and CC; R. 720-725, 694-95, 738-758, and
647-650.) Furthermore, none of the Division's allegations were supported in any respect by
the Division's responses to Petitioners' first set of discovery requests. (R. 738-802.) There
was further no evidence which the Division proffered which could rebut the fact that no
solicitation, encouragement or aiding of any such sellers was involved, even if "solicitation"
was legally relevant to such motion, which it was not. The foregoing is also not to ignore
that only Petitioner Johnson, not Petitioner Johnson-Bowles, was involved in the purchases
in issue. Thus, at a minimum, summary judgment dismissing the amended petitions against
Petitioner Johnson-Bowles should have been granted.
"Solicitation" is only an issue insofar as it involves one of the federal and state
exemptions from registration. Other than being applicable to a specific exemption, the term
"solicitation" has no meaning and no bearing on anything in securities laws. For example,
§4(4) of the Securities Act of 1933, "Broker's Transactions", Vol. 1, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
11555 at p. 1574, provides an exemption from §5 [the registration provisions] of the Act as
follows:
Sec. 4. The provisions of section 5 shall not apply to — . . . (4)
brokers' transactions, executed upon customers' orders on any
exchange or in the over-the-counter market but not the
solicitation of such orders. [Emphasis added.]
(See Ex. E.) Utah Code Ann. §61-1-14(2)(c), is the state corollary to the federal, §4(4)
exemption. However, it goes one step further by including language specifically proscribing
sales by broker-dealers. It reads:
The following transactions are exempted from Sections 61-1-7
and 61-1-15:

-64-

(c) any non-issuer transaction effected by or through a
registered broker-dealer pursuant to an unsolicited order or
offer to buy; . . . . [Emphasis added.]
(See Ex. C.) The Division's March 1, 1989, Summary Order allegedly suspended all §14(2)
exemptions, including subparagraph (c) thereof. The Division alleged "solicitation" on the
part of Petitioners (not merely Petitioner Johnson) in Count I as if Petitioners were in fact
relying on §14(2)(c), the so-called "brokers' special exemption" or the "unsolicited order
exemption", when, in fact, Petitioners do not need an exemption to effect a "purchase".23
In other words, the Division suspended Utah's "unsolicited order exemption" — which, by
the way, only pertains to "buys" by "customers" from broker-dealers by its own
unambiguous language — only to allege in Count I that Petitioners don't have that very
exemption — an exemption Petitioners never argued they ever had or needed to have in the
first place. Were this case to involve "sales" by Petitioner Johnson to certain Utah
residents, instead of the other way around, the Division could contend that Petitioner
Johnson "solicited" his "customers" and therefore further contend that he or
Johnson-Bowles (whoever the "seller" would be) lacked Utah's §14(2)(c) exemption from
registration. As a result, the burden would be on Petitioners to prove the availability of
§14(2)(c) or another exemption. Unfortunately for the Division, "solicitation" is not at issue
in these proceedings — even under express Utah law — because (1) no "sales" by
Petitioners occurred as contemplated in §14(2)(c), and (2) Petitioners are not and never
have claimed an exemption simply to "purchase", let alone the §14(2)(c) exemption. In short,
"solicitation" which, if it was applicable, which it is not, would only mean that Petitioners —

2 3see e.g., Rule 144(g)(2) of the General Rules and Regulations of the Securities & Exchange
ComnfTssTon, Reg. 5230.144, Fed.Sec.L.Rep. (CCH) 1I2705A at p. 2788; Upton, Broker-Dealer
Regulation, Clark Boardman Securities Law Series, Vol. 15, §3.03[3][d]L1], p. 3-95, (". . . the
prohibition on solicitation of customers applies only to the solicitation of buy orders, rather
than the solicitation of sell orders.").
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if they were "sellers" — would have the burden of proving entitlement to the §14(2)(c)
exemption. See Utah Code Ann. §61-1-14.5. "Solicitation" is thus irrelevant as a matter of
law to Petitioners' alleged conduct. See also, Hicks, J. William, Exempted Transactions
under the Securities Act of 1933, Clark Boardman Securities Law Series, Vol. 7C, Chapter
13, First Edition, 1989, pp. 13-1 through 13-76, Rel. #22, 6/89.
Based on the affidavits filed by Petitioners in support of summary judgment,
affidavits unrebutted by the Division, there was no genuine issue of material fact.
Accordingly, the ALJ erred in not dismissing the amended petitions under Rule 56, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
6. FORMER DIVISION DIRECTOR JOHN C. BALDWIN'S APRIL 9, 1990, ORDER ON
AGENCY REVIEW DENYING ANY ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE ALJ'S
MARCH 23, 1990, ORDER (DENYING SUMMARY JUDGMENT) WAS ERRONEOUS AND HAS
OTHERWISE PREJUDICED PETITIONERS.
This order (Ex. BB; R. 1230.) ought to be reversed for the same general reasons
as those articulated in Petitioners' corollary appeal relative to Mr. Baldwin's similar October
30, 1989, Order on Agency Review, Case No. 900210-CA. This is so even though Mr.
Baldwin's April 1990, order is not the subject of such appeal. Reference is thus made to
such related appeal.
In addition, however, such order is erroneous because the ALJ's Order of
March 23, 1990, denying Petitioners' motion for summary judgment was based exclusively
on second-hand hearsay statements, which were neither in proper affidavit format nor
averred on personal knowledge. Thus, they were inadmissible to defeat summary judgment
under Rule 56, a rule incorporated into the UAPA under Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-1(4)(b).
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Based on the Division's defective affidavit and an unverified internal Division memorandum
— which were both subject to a motion to strike by Petitioners — it was concluded that
there was a remaining issue of fact as to "solicitation". Such is manifest error because the
opposing affidavits failed to create an issue of fact as to "solicitation" and the proceedings
never should have gone to trial before the Securities Advisory Board.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that, in administrative proceedings, "findings
. . . cannot be based exclusively on hearsay evidence. They must be supported by a
residuum of legal evidence competent in a court of law." Yacht Club v. Utah Liquor Control
Commission, 681 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Utah 1984), Wilson v. The Industrial Commission of Utah,
735 P.2d 403, 55 Utah Adv. Rep. 56 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). See also Sandy State Bank of
Brimhall, 636 P.2d 481 (Utah 1981); Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617 P.2d 693 (Utah
1980). There can be no dispute that the Division's defective affidavit and unverified internal
memo were not "substantial evidence" that would be competent in a court of law to defeat
Petitioners' motion for summary judgment. Calhoun v. Bailar, 626 F.2d 145 (9th Cir.
1980)(discussing admissibility of hearsay in administrative proceedings). However, based
exclusively on the Division's defective affidavit and such Division internal memorandum, the
ALJ "found" on March 23, 1990, that there was an issue of fact as to "solicitation".
[Emphasis added.] In Cooper v. U.S., (Ct. of Claims) 639 F.2d 727, 730 (1980), the Court
stated:
Upon specific facts of this case, however, the hearsay relied
upon by the Government was not sufficient to constitute
substantial evidence. We arrive at our conclusion basically for
three reasons.
In removing plaintiff, the Government relied solely on the DIS
report, the contents of which consisted merely of data
excerpted from state arrest records, a police officer's report of
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interviews with witnesses, and a DIS interview with an
investigator as to why no information was filed on the involuntary
sexual battery charge. This type of attenuated and highly
unreliable evidence is qualitatively, at best, triple hearsay. It is
beyond doubt that the hearsay evidence before the Government
should not have been given any probative force without some
assurance of its creditability and reliability. See Richardson v.
Perales, 4012 U.S. 389, 402, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 LEd.2d 842
(1972); Peters v. United States, 187 Ct.CI. 63, 408 F.2d 719
(1969).
For these reasons, the ALJ's March 23, 1990, determination that "solicitation" remained an
issue of fact to defeat summary judgment was error. That it was error is further confirmed
— with admitted hindsight — by the Securities Advisory Board's specific "finding" on p.6,
f 12 in its August 13, Findings of Fact, that Petitioners did not engage in the "solicitation" of
anyone. (Ex. EE; R. 1129-1141.)
Mr. Baldwin's affirmation (by default) of the ALJ's March Order ignored other
factors. For instance, the ALJ's determination that former Johnson-Bowles trader Bruce
Eatchel's alleged (hearsay) conversations with Paul Jones, an NASD member and trader of
U.S.A. Medical securities, constituted "sufficient evidence" of "solicitation" to create an
issue of fact as to Petitioners in that regard. [Emphasis added.] Significantly, neither the
Division's amended petitions nor their opposing affidavits alleged that Eatchel was an aider
and abettor, a co-conspirator, a substantial participant or factor, or that he was a person
"controlled" by Johnson-Bowles or Marlen V. Johnson under securities laws; they further do
not allege that Eatchel was acting within the scope of his employment or agency when he
engaged in such alleged conversations with Jones concerning U.S.A. Medical. The Division
made no allegations of any kind which would even imply the foregoing. This is not to ignore
that Eatchel, Johnson, and Johnson-Bowles attested under oath to the contrary with
admissible evidence under Rule 56 — evidence which was not rebutted in the least by the
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Division. (Ex. U and W; R. 720-725. 647-50. 738-758. and 694-95.) Without more, there
can be no dispute that whatever Eatchel may have said, it does not result in respondeat
superior liability on the part of Petitioners which could create an issue of fact as to their
alleged "solicitation" of Jones. (Innumerable citations holding that securities brokerage
firms not responsible for the oral communications of their employee/brokers omitted.)
The ALJ further determined (Ex. AA.) that Petitioner Johnson's alleged
conversation with one John Dawson created an issue of fact as to "solicitation". Regardless
of the fact that the Division's evidence was procedurally defective in this regard, even if it
wasn't, such conversation never resulted in a sale of U.S.A. Medical stock and thus never
resulted in a violation of the Division's March 1, 1989. suspension of exemption order. Thus,
such evidence, whether admissible or not. could not create an issue of fact as to whether
Dawson was "solicited" or "induced" to violate Utah law. simply because he never did. To be
sure, the amended petitions do not allege that simply talking to someone about U.S.A.
Medical after March 1, 1989, without anything more, is itself "dishonest or unethical"
conduct on the part of Petitioners. Certainly there is nothing "dishonest or unethical" about
exercising one's First Amendment right of free speech.
On the other hand, assuming ad arguendo that Petitioners indeed somehow,
through Eatchel. directly or indirectly, "solicited" licensed broker Paul Jones to sell his
U.S.A. Medical stock, it is undisputed that Paul Jones was an NASD registered
representative and himself a trader of U.S.A. Medical securities (f 14, p. 3-4, Stipulation of
Facts for Purposes of Hearing, Ex. CC; R. 1156-1157), and therefore, as a matter of law, he
was "sophisticated", more especially vis-a-vis U.S.A. Medical and its stock. The law is well
settled that a sophisticated investor of the caliber of Jones, by his mere status (and obvious
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knowledge of the Division's March 1, 1989 Order), could not have been "solicited", aided,
encouraged, counseled, or urged to sell his U.S.A. Medical stock to Petitioners. This is
confirmed, for example, by the highly significant First Circuit case of Kennedy v. Josephthal
& Company, Inc., 814 F.2d 798 (1st Cir., 1987), ['87 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
1193,186, p. 95,859 (holding that because investors were sophisticated, there was a
"complete absence of justifiable reliance" on the alleged oral misrepresentations and
inducements of the broker). In this case, Jones was not an investor but a licensed
securities trader who had himself been making a market in U.S.A. Medical stock with local
broker-dealer Wasatch Stock Trading. Furthermore, Petitioners never made (or are alleged
to have made) any "misrepresentations or inducements" to Jones in order to get him to part
with his U.S.A. Medical stock. (R. 161-168.) Thus, the Kennedy holding ought to apply to
Jones to a far greater degree than it did to the sophisticated plaintiffs in that case. In
short, if Jones was legally incapable of being "solicited", how was there an issue of fact as
to his being "solicited"?
Based on the foregoing, both the ALJ and Baldwin erred in not dismissing the
proceedings.
7. THE SECURITIES ADVISORY BOARD AND DIVISION DIRECTOR JOHN C.
BALDWIN'S AUGUST 13, 1990, FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER
THEREON ARE PATENTLY ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD BE REVERSED. (Ex. EE; R. 1129-1141.)
A. It is legally impossible for Petitioners to be liable without having "solicited"
their sellers.
After 1^ years of relentless litigation, the Division's entire case against
Petitioners rested on an "aiding and abetting" theory. However, if Petitioners did not
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"solicit" their sellers to sejl (as unambiguously held in 1112, page 6 of the Securities Advisory
Board's August 13, 1990, Findings of Fact), it is legally impossible for Petitioners to have
"aided and abetted" such persons1 alleged violations of a strict liability statute prohibiting
only the sale of securities. [Emphasis added.] (See, e.g., Pinter v. Dahl infra.) This is in turn
because, not having induced their sellers to part with their stock, Petitioners cannot have
legally "substantially participated" in such underlying and unilateral illegality — a necessary
prerequisite for aiding and abetting liability to attach. Kerbs v. Fall River Industries, Inc.,
(CA-10, 1974) 502 F.2d 731, [ 7 4 - 7 5 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) *94,788.
Thus, the August 13, Order is error because there was no evidence by which Petitioners
could be found guilty of anything, more especially aiding and abetting. Simply put, if
Petitioners didn't "solicit", induce, or encourage anyone to violate the law (p. 6, *12, Ex. EE),
Petitioners, by definition, could not have "substantially participated" in the alleged unilateral
illegality, namely, the unlawful securities sales themselves (i.e., parting with title to securities
in exchange for consideration). [Emphasis added.] The foregoing is perhaps what this
entire case boils down to and because the August 13, 1990, Order concludes the contrary,
it must be vacated and reversed. In this regard, reference is made to David R. King's expert
testimony at pages 190-203 of Exhibit "A" to Petitioner's August 23, 1990, Request for
Agency Review, testimony dispensed with in the August 13, Order as being "specious". (Ex.
DD; R. 1049-1062.) Therein Mr. King, a former staff attorney for the SEC, testified that
Petitioners' conduct was not and could not have been "dishonest or unethical". Thus, while
supposedly deferring to so-called "agency expertise", Mr. King was flatly ignored.
Furthermore, if one does a search of all the case law interpreting §12(1) of the Securities
Act of 1933 — the federal counterpart to the statute in issue in this case — one will not
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find a single solitary case in which a person — let alone the purchaser involved — can "aid
and abet" the violation of such strict liability statute.
Naturally, if Petitioners did not aid and abet their sellers, they could not have
engaged in "dishonest or unethical business practices". This is confirmed by the
cross-examination of Broker-Dealer Section Director Kathleen C. McGinley in Exhibit "A" to
the Request for Agency Review in which she clearly admits that the Division's entire case
rested on an "aiding and abetting" theory. (See p. 37, lines 7-9, R. 896 and p. 40,1. 22-25,
p. 41,1. 1-3, R. 899-900.).
The U.S. Supreme Court case of Pinter v. Dahl, (June 15, 1988), 486 U.S. 622,
108 S.Ct. 2063, 100 L.Ed.2d 658, ['87-'88 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) *93.790,
is directly on point. In Pinter, the U.S. Supreme Court held that liability for the sale of
unregistered securities under §12(1) of the Act could extend to persons who successfully
"solicit" a "purchase" (not a sale) of securities (by someone else) so long as the solicitors are
motivated by a desire to serve their own financial interests or those of the securities owner.
The Court categorically rejected the "substantial factor" test — one of the three prongs of
the aiding and abetting test — under which liability may be imposed on persons whose
participation in the sales transaction was a "substantial factor" in causing the transaction to
take place. By way of background, Pinter involved a civil suit by purchasers who were
damaged by certain parties who talked them (as purchasers) into buying (not selling)
unregistered stock; in the case before this Court, the purchasers are the Petitioners
themselves, who could not have engaged in "soliciting" under Pinter by virtue of the fact
that they didn't "solicit" anyone to "purchase" — they themselves, and no one else, being the
purchasers. (See again f 12, page 6 of such Findings of Fact.) Were Pinter to apply to the
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instant case, the legal effect would be that Petitioners are to sue themselves and only
themselves to recover something they have no desire or need to recover. This is but further
evidence that the Division's August 13, Order, is contrary to the law of the land and
otherwise totally nonsensical.
By way of additional technical background, §12(1) of the Securities Act of 1933
(to which Utah Code Ann. §61-1-22(1 )(a), is the state counterpart), provides that if a
security is unregistered and the seller has no exemption from registration, the purchaser
can seek rescission from his or her immediate seller — and no one else (other than perhaps
a "control person" of the seller under §15 of the Securities Act).24 | n short, §12(1) is
nothing but a strict liability, rescission statute designed only to protect a "purchaser" of
securities, allowing him or her to unwind the transaction when the seller has not adhered to
the required technicalities. Further, the statute could not logically apply to aiders and
abettors because, their not being sellers of the stock, how could anyone contend that they
needed an exemption? In this case, the Petitioners were but purchasers of unregistered
stock and the Division is applying the rescission statute (one which ironically exists only to
protect Petitioners as purchasers) to contend that they, as purchasers, aided and abetted a
violation of law solely enacted to protect them and only them — simply because they
"purchased" stock that was unregistered. This is simply absurd in the context of a
rescission statute requiring privity of contract between a seller and his direct buyer. (See
Schvaveveldt v. Noy-Burn, supra at p. 554.) Certainly if a person buys a car from General
Motors he can't obtain rescission from someone who didn't sell him the car in the first place
(including himself). Yet this is the Division's case. In fact, it would be even more ridiculous

2 * i t has never been alleged, let alone proven, that Petitioners "controlled" their sellers
under either §15 of the '33 Act or Utah Code Ann. §61-1-22(2), the state counterpart thereto, now
amended, effective April 23, 1990, as §61^1^2?^).
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for a purchaser to sue himself for aiding and abetting an unlawful sale to himself. Going a
step further, the conspicuous legal precedent necessarily resulting from the Division's
August 13, Order, is that, thanks to the Division, a seller who unlawfully sells unregistered,
non-exempt securities can now defend a §12(1) or Utah Code Ann. §61-1-22(1 )(a) lawsuit
by his purchaser by saying that his purchaser aided and abetted him — merely by
purchasing the illegally sold stock!! [Emphasis added.] Petitioners doubt that the Division
has realized the dangerous precedent that it has now created to protect professional stock
swindlers, a precedent that would enable criminals to sell unregistered, non-exempt stock
with a Division-endorsed, strict liability defense. The end result and irony is that while the
Division parades the banner of the so-called "public interest", the legal precedent resulting
from its August 13, Order — a precedent establishing a strict liability defense to §12(1) and
§61-1-22(1 )(a) — could not be less in the "public interest" and will no doubt substantially
harm the investing public in the long run.
Putting the foregoing in even another perspective, aiding and abetting is only
used in the context of fraud, namely, when a defrauded purchaser cannot get his money
back from his immediate seller and it allows the purchaser to pursue — under §12(2), not
§12(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 — aiders and abettors of the seller who may have
deeper pockets, more particularly when the immediate seller (who directly engaged in the
fraud) is judgment proof. [Emphasis added.] A good example, at least in this district, is
U.S. District Judge Greene's decision in Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corp. v. Provo
Excelsior, Ltd., 664 F. Supp. 1405 (DC Utah), ['87-'88 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) f93,754 (adopting the "substantial factor" test for secondary liability under §12(2),
not §12(1)). In the case now before this Court, Petitioners are not and never have been
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charged with either fraud or a violation of §61-1-22(1 )(b), and thus, aiding and abetting is
wholly inapplicable.
Because a person cannot violate §12(1) of the '33 Act or Utah Code Ann.
§61-1 -22(1 )(a) if he or she has not "solicited" the sale (as opposed to the purchase) under
Pinter v. Dahl, and because Petitioners didn't even "solicit" the purchase, the Division's
August 13, Order, which concludes the contrary, is erroneous and must be vacated.
B. The August 13, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order "Find"
Petitioners guilty of a "violation" for which they were never charged.
As a direct result of the Division's overzealousness at "convicting" Petitioners,
the Board's August 13, 1990, Order goes so far as to "find" Petitioners "guilty" of directly
violating the Division's March 1, 1989, Summary Order. (Ex. EE; R. 1129-1141.) Without
reiterating previous argument to the effect that exemptions are not needed to effect
securities purchases, this is a "crime" that Petitioners were never charged with in the
amended petitions. (See, p. 40,1. 22-25, p. 41,1. 1-3, R. 899-900; see also Ex. L.) In fact,
what is remarkable is that the Division initially alleged such direct liability in its initial April
27, 1989, petitions (R. 263-295) only to turn around in July 1989, and delete such charges in
its amended petitions. Because someone cannot be "convicted" of a "crime" for which he or
she was never charged, the August 13, Order must be vacated and reversed.
C. Because the Division only had power or authority to suspend exemptions, or
even trading, for 10 days, there was no Division order in effect to proscribe (or affect)
Petitioners' conduct after at least March 10, 1989. As a result, the "final agency action" is
manifest error and must be reversed and dismissed.
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The Division makes no "finding" in its August 13, 1990, Order as to exactly when
Petitioners specifically purchased U.S.A. Medical securities in order to determine that such
constituted a "dishonest or unethical practice", (p. 11, Ex. EE; R. 1129-1141.) It does
conclude, however, that Petitioners only violated the March 1, Summary Order, (p. 9, bott.,
p. 10, top, Ex. EE; R. 1129-41.) Based on these "conclusions of law", there is a complete
lack of evidence to "find" Petitioners "guilty" of engaging in "dishonest or unethical
practices" during the pendency of the Division's March 1,1989, Summary Order, an order
which, under Utah Code Ann. §61-1-14(3), lawfully expired by at least March 10, 1989. (Cf.
Utah Code Ann. §61-1-12(2)(c)(iii).) In other words, since there was no evidence that
Petitioners "purchased" any U.S.A. Medical stock between March 1 and March 10, 1989, the
August 13, Order is unsupported by the evidence. Accordingly, the August 13, Order as
adopted by the Executive Director of the Department of Commerce on October 29, 1990,
must be reversed and vacated.
D. The Conclusions of Law in the Board's August 13, 1990, Order are not
supported by "substantial evidence," including, the July 8, 1990, Stipulation of Facts for
Purposes of Hearing. (Ex. CC; R. 1129-1141.) For this reason, such Order must be
reversed and the proceedings dismissed.
The August 13, 1990, Order "finds" Petitioners guilty of "dishonest or unethical
practices" based solely on the repeated lip service paid to the words: "driven by a desire to
realize monetary gain and/or avoid financial loss". Petitioners did not buy the stock to make
any profit but to stay alive and otherwise protect those to whom they owed stock —
persons that they needed to remain in good stead with were they to continue in business.
Were Petitioners to cause Midwest Clearing, Spear, Leads & Kellog, M.S. Myerson, William
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Frankel & Co., Paragon Capital Corp., Merrill, Lynch, etc., to incur several hundred thousand
dollars in losses, no doubt Petitioners would have been all washed-up in the brokerage
business — not to mention defending at least five other lawsuits. Certainly Petitioners have
a duty to mitigate their damages and those potentially caused others by the fraud in this
case.
In this case, Petitioners were acting in good faith out of self-preservation and
a desire to protect those they never could have reimbursed. They were not acting for
profit. Surely anyone can see that there is a substantial difference between being "greedy"
and losing $500,000 of investment capital or causing others to lose the same, not to
mention one's business and reputation. Because Petitioners' conduct was not "for financial
gain" but was merely to mitigate potential losses caused by a fraud unrelated to them, their
conduct was reasonable and justified. Because the August 13, Findings, Conclusions, and
Order mischaracterize and misconstrue the evidence, it is unsupported and must be
reversed.
E. The sanction imposed by the August 13, Order is arbitrary and ridiculous in
comparison to the alleged "violation" and must be revered accordingly.
Attached in Petitioners' Addendum as Ex. KK are certified copies of the
Division's disciplinary accomplishments relative to other licensed broker-dealers and
agents. In such cases, each respondent engaged in far more egregious conduct, including
specified "dishonest or unethical practices", yet each one's sanction was far less severe
than that imposed on Petitioners herein. In fact, in one instance the suspension was one
day. This exhibit demonstrates that the sanction imposed in this case is wholly arbitrary and
capricious and that it was only entered to "teach Petitioners a lesson" for resisting the
Division.
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By the same token, Exhibit JJ includes certified copies of James L. Averett's
Amended Felony Information, Criminal Judgment, and Conditions of Probation and
Supervised Release in a case before U.S. District Court Judge David Sam. In such action,
Mr. Averett, a local attorney, pleaded guilty to criminal conspiracy to commit fraud in the
sale of U.S.A. Medical securities. Mr. Averett received mere probation under Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and is still a member in good standing of the Utah State Bar.
Exhibits KK and JJ are offered to demonstrate not only that the Division's
sanction is arbitrary and capricious, but that the Division's conduct with respect to
Petitioners is a violation of their equal protection of the laws.
F. There was no evidence to support a "finding" in the August 13,1990, Order
that Petitioners' sellers lacked exemptions from registration, and therefore, there is no
evidence that Petitioners could have engaged in "dishonest or unethical practices" under
any theory.
The Division never proved that Petitioners' sellers lacked exemptions from
registration for their admitted sales of U.S.A. Medical stock to Petitioners. This alleged
prerequisite to Petitioners' liability was simply assumed in the August 13, Order. The failure
of the Division to carry this burden relative to Petitioners' sellers is dispositive of this
appeal. Accordingly, without any such finding or without any evidence to support any such
finding — it all being assumed in the August 13, Order that Petitioners' sellers lacked
exemptions — there is no corollary evidence that Petitioners did anything, let alone anything
wrong or improper relative to their sellers' conduct. Thus, the August 13, 1990, Order is
wholly unsupported by the evidence.
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8. THE DIVISION'S IGNORING OF PETITIONERS' AUGUST 20. 1990. OBJECTION
TO THE FORM AND CONTENT OF THE AUGUST 13. 1990. FINDINGS OF FACT. CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER HAS PREJUDICED PETITIONERS. (Ex. FF; R. 1116-1120.) THE
DIVISION'S FURTHER IGNORING OF PETITIONERS' AUGUST 20. 1990. DEMAND FOR
DISCLOSURE OF HOW AND BY WHOM THE AUGUST 13. 1990. FINDINGS OF FACT.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER WAS PREPARED. INCLUDING THE SUPPORTING
AFFIDAVIT. HAS FURTHER PREJUDICED PETITIONERS. (Ex. GG and HH; R. 1112-1115 and
1121-21.)
Immediately after the July 16. 1990, hearing, Petitioners were informed by the
ALJ that the Board's ultimate Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Thereon
would be prepared by the Board with the assistance of the ALJ who presided at such
hearing. Upon receipt of the same, Petitioners knew that it had not been drafted by either
the Board or the ALJ. This is evidenced by Petitioners' affidavit filed in support of their
Motion for Disclosure. (Ex. HH; R. 1121-25.) On the contrary, it was self-evident that the
same had been unilaterally drafted by Mr. Mark J. Griffin, the Division's counsel, without any
input, knowledge or notice on the part of either Petitioners or their counsel.
Petitioners reached this conclusion because the Order tracked Mr. Griffin's
closing argument virtually verbatim. (See R. 1085-1091 and 1101-1104.) This type of
deliberate and unethical agency sandbagging has prejudiced Petitioners in that they are
"stuck" with such Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on this appeal. Furthermore,
such "findings" are inconsistent with what actually occurred at the hearing as evidenced by
the entire transcript. (R. 860-1111.) Such ex parte sandbagging is grossly improper for the
very reasons that under Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial Administration, respective
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counsel are to work together in drafting written orders and judgments. Since the ALJ
deferred to the prosecutor to draft the August 13, Findings, Conclusions, and Order, it was
only fair that Petitioners be given the right to contribute to drafting such to the same
degree as the Division's counsel. Instead, however, once this was brought to the Division's
attention on August 20, it was ignored.
The Division's overzealousness in its compulsion to prevail by secretly
"doctoring" the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law is prejudicial error. Not only did
the Division take the same out of the hands of the ALJ, but it deprived Petitioners of any
say-so in the creation of the same. Petitioners are prejudiced because this Court may not
take the time to read the entire transcript of the hearing, including the testimony of
Petitioners' expert (Ex. DD) and it may well take the "doctored" Findings at face value. This
Court should not countenance such outrageous agency misconduct designed only to prevail
at all costs. Because it is unconstitutional for the prosecutor to act as judge, the
proceedings should be vacated and dismissed. (See the so-called Morgan Quartet in
administrative law, i.e., "he who decides must hear", 298 U.S. 468 (1936); 304 U.S. 1 (1938);
and 313 U.S. 409 (1941). See also Gifford, "The Morgan Cases: A Retrospective View", 30
Admin. L. Rev. 237 (1978).) At the same time, it is noteworthy that the ALJ signed the
Division's Amended Notice of Agency action (R. 261-264) and former Division director
Baldwin signed the Division's motion to convert. (R. 260.) It is thus evident that not only has
Griffin acted as prosecutor and judge in the proceedings below, but the ALJ and Baldwin
have also acted as judge and prosecutor below. The U.S. Supreme Court has held such
conflicts of interest unconstitutional in administrative adjudicative proceedings. Withrow v.
Larking, 421 U.S. 35, 43 L. Ed. 2d 712, 723-24, 95 S. Ct. 1456 (1975). (See pp. 4, 23. and 24
of Petitioners' brief in Case No. 900210-CA.)
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Based on the foregoing, the August 13, Order is inherently prejudicial and
unconstitutional and must be reversed.
9. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR DAVID L. BUHLER'S
OCTOBER 29, 1990, ORDER ON AGENCY REVIEW, ADOPTING THE AUGUST 13, 1990,
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER IN ITS ENTIRETY, COMPOUNDS THE
ERRORS IN ALL OF THE PREVIOUS ORDERS AND AGENCY ACTIONS FROM WHICH APPEAL IS
SOUGHT. (Ex. II; R. 830-842.)
Executive Director Buhler's Order adds nothing to that which the Division was
hell-bent on obtaining, namely, putting Petitioners out-of-business no matter what the cost
to the Utah taxpayer. However, because the August 13, Findings concluded that Petitioners
did not "solicit" their sellers, Petitioners served a September 10, 1990, letter on Mr. Buhler
which detailed why there could be no legal "conclusion" of "dishonest or unethical practices"
as a matter of law. (R. 843-851.) As set forth above, under the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Pinter v. Dahl, it is legally impossible to be liable under §12(1) of the Securities
Act of 1933, the corollary to Utah Code Ann. §61-1-22(1 )(a), if one does not "solicit" a
non-exempt sale to someone else. Thus, in ignoring Petitioners' counsel's September 10,
letter, including the Pinter decision, Mr. Buhler's Order on Review is erroneous and should
be reversed for each and every reason set forth above.
CONCLUSION
After wading through the foregoing prolix brief, Petitioners would hope that
the Court is just as exasperated and perplexed as they are as to why or how the Division
believes this case is even remotely "in the public interest". In fact, the entire proceedings
below accomplish nothing in terms of teaching someone a lesson, other than: "You can't
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fight City Hall." The only thing to be learned from the proceedings below is that it pays to
keep one's mouth shut and go along with a fraud, more especially when one is a victim (or
potential victim), not only of fraud, but of a more dangerous creature: a power-hungry
regulatory agency that is incapable of distinguishing victims from perpetrators. Because
the Division's amended petitions categorically penalize "whistleblowing", the result of which
any intelligent broker would be insane to ever cooperate with the Division, such petitions
are ironically contrary to the "public interest," including public policy. (See SEC v. Dirks,
supra.) In other words, the lesson in "ethics" so eloquently taught by the Division is that
Petitioners should have quietly given convicted felon Mike Strand the several hundred
thousand dollars he wanted for the stock (even if it required a payment plan) and today,
both they, Mr. Strand and his unsavory co-conspirators, including U.S.A. Medical
Corporation, would still be in business.
Other than a complete "non-lesson", the legal precedent resulting from any
endorsement of the Division's August 13, 1990, Order, is that one who sells non-exempt
stock has a Division-endorsed, strict liability defense against his purchaser who might sue
him under either §12(1) of the '33 Act or Utah's corollary. This too makes the result of the
proceedings below contrary to "public policy" if not simply ludicrous.
Based on the foregoing, Petitioners would hope that the Court reverses the
"final agency action" on any number of grounds under Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4) and
that the Division be given a strong reprimand not to waste everyone's time and money again
in the future on something of equal or comparable pointlessness, including but not limited
to the evil of trying to extort a $50,000 "fine" out of a licensee when the agency has no
authority to do so.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
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DATED this 23rd day of January. 1991

JolflfMichaffl Coombs
^Craig F. McCullough
Attorneys for Petitioners

PROOF OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 23rd day of January, 1991. (s)he
hand-delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF PETITIONERS and
PETITIONERS' ADDENDUM to:
Earl S. Maeser, Director
Utah Division of Securities
Utah Department of Commerce
160 East 300 South, Second Floor
P.O. Box 45802
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0802
and two (2) of the same to:
Mark J. Griffin
David B. Thompson
Assistants Attorney General
115 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

KlBai—-
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FILE
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JAN 2 ~ 1991

ooOoo
Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc.,
and Marlen Vernon Johnson,

ORDER

ClerKoftheCoi A
Utah Court of Appeals

Case No.

900558-CA

Petitioner,
v.
The Division of Securities and
Utah Department of Commerce,
State of Utah,
Respondents.

The above-entitled matter is before the Court upon
petitioner's Motion to Supplement the Record filed 31 December,
1990.

Respondent's objection to the motion was filed 9 January,

1991.
Now therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is
denied.

Such denial is without prejudice to 1) petitioner's ability

to renew the motion before the panel to whom this case is assigned
for disposition on the merits and 2) such panel's prerogative to
take judicial notice of the supplemental materials referred to if
such panel determines they are relevant and that it may
appropriately do so.

32 ^
Dated this Q-<^
BY THE COURT:

Gregory K.^Orme, Judge

day of January, 1991.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc.,
and Marlen Vernon Johnson,

ORDER

Petitioner,
v.

900558-CA

The Division of Securities
and the Utah Department of
Commerce, State of Utah,
Respondents.

This matter is before the court upon petitioner7s motion for
leave to file overlength brief and supporting memorandum, filed 23
January 1991.
The court having considered the motion and supporting
affidavit, and no response having been filed in opposition thereto,
Now therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is granted
and the brief is accepted for filing.

The grant of this motion is

without prejudice to the prerogatives of the panel to whom this case
is assigned for consideration on the merits to strike such portions
of the brief as may be found, upon closer study, to be unnecessary,
unhelpful, or not in compliance with the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.

Y*>

Dated this
BY THE COURT:

Judge Gregory K. Orme

day of February, 1991.

FILED
John Michael Coombs #3639
72 East 400 South, Suite 220
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
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COURT OF APPEALS

Craig F. McCullough #2166
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER
10 East South Temple, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: 530-7307
ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONERS
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
IN AND BEFORE THE UTAH
COURT OF THE APPEALS
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPANY, INC., and :
MARLEN VERNON JOHNSON,
:
Petitioners,
v.

:

CORRECTED TABLE OF
AUTHORITIES IN
PETITIONERS' BRIEF

.

The
OF SECURITIES
and
the DIVISION
UTAH DEPARTMENT
OFCOMMERCE,
STATE OF UTAH,
:

Case No. 900558-CA

Respondents.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that based on the time constraints of
getting Petitioners' Brief filed on January 23, 1991,
Petitioners' sub-section containing "Statues, Rules, and Other
Authorities Cited" on pages ix through xii contain errors. While
Petitioners' were able to code the statutes, rules, and
authorities cited, they were unable to properly organize such in
a format to make them easily readable.
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Attached hereto are four

pages substituting and correcting the sub-section in Petitioners'
Brief entitled "Statutes, Rules, and Other Authorities Cited"
which have been further broken down into categories of "Federal,
State, and Other Authorities".
The Court is respectfully requested to refer to such
corrected portion of the Table of Authorities when reading or
reviewing Petitioners' Brief in the above-matter.
DATED t h i s

1 2 t h day of FelShi^jry,^1091,

„..Mi4ft

John "Micnaerl Cox^m
.Attorney for Petitioners
CERTIFICATE JOF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 12th day of
February, 1991, (s)he mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing CORRECTED TABLE OF AUTHORITIES IN PETITIONERS' BRIEF by
regular mail, postage prepaid to:
R. Paul Van Dam, #3312
Attorney General
David N. Sonnenreich, #4917
Assistant Attorney General
Fair Business Enforcement Unit
115 State Capitol Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: 538-1331

Earl S. Maeser, Director
Utah Division of Securities
Utah Department of Commerce
160 East 300 South, 2nd Floor
P.O. Box 45802
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0802

1000.01A:ABRIEF.1-2
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STATUTES, RULES, AND OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED
A.

FEDERAL RULES AND STATUTES:
Page

§4, Securities Act of 1933

59

§4(4), Securities Act of 1933

64

§5, Securities Act of 1933

5,57,58,64

§12(1), Securities Act of 1933

57,71,72,73,74,81,82

§12(2), Securities Act of 1933

57,74

§15, Securities Act of 1933

73

§9, Securities Exchange Act of 1934

53

§10, Securities Exchange Act of 1934

53

§12 (j ) , Securities Exchange Act of 1934

59

§12(k), Securities Exchange Act of 1934

59,60

§15, Securities Exchange Act of 1934

31,53

§15A, Securities Exchange Act of 1934

31

§19, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78a-78jj

26

§19(g)(l), Securities Exchange Act of 1934

26

§19 (h) (2) , Securities Exchange Act of 1934

26

§27, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. §77aa...26,30,31
§28(a), Securities Exchange Act of 1934
15 U.S.C. §7 8a-7 8jj

30,31,36,41,47
26

15 U.S.C. §7 8o-3(b) (7)

34,38

15 U.S.C.A. §7 8bb(a)

31

18 U.S.C. §2

56

ix

18 U.S.C. §1341

56

18 U.S.C. §1343

56

Art. I, §10, Cl. 1, Federal Constitution

47,48

Art. IV, Sec. 1, Federal Constitution

39,46,47

Art. IV, Sec. 2, Federal Constitution

39,46,47

Art. Ill, §1, NASD Rules of Fair
Practice

13,14,25,26,30, 31,38,49

Art. 8, Uniform Commercial Code

15

Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. §78bb( a ) (1982 ) ]

41

NASAA Guidelines , 11401

49

NASD Manual (CCH), §59, "Close-Out Procedure",
Uniform Practice Code, pp. 3577-3583, Rel. #195
(April, 1982)

12

Rule 10b-5, General Rules and Regulations of the SEC

10,57

Rule 10b-6, General Rules and Regulations of the SEC

54

Rule 144(g)(2), General Rules and Regulations of the SEC

65

SEC Exchange Act Rel. #34-7920

14

Supremacy Clause, Art. IV, Cl. II

36

B.

UTAH RULES AND STATUES:

Art. I, §18, Utah Constitution
Art. VI, Sec. 1, Utah's Constitution
Division Rule R177-6-lg

42,48
31
13,48,49,51,53

Rule 12(b)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

1,4,23,27,43,49

Rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Proceudre

1,5,61

Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 56(c) , Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

1,66,68
5

Rule 56(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

5,6

Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial Administration

79

Utah Code Ann. §61-1-6

17,35

Utah Code Ann. §61-1-6(1)

34,36

Utah Code Ann. §61-1-6(1) (g)
Utah Code Ann. §61-1-7

3,13,16,43,48,49,50,51,53
56,57,58,64

Utah Code Ann. §61-1-12(2) (c) (iii)
Utah Code Ann. §61-1-14(2)

76
12,54,59,65

Utah Code Ann. §61-l-14(2)(c)

64,65,66

Utah Code Ann. §61-1-14(3)

12,44,54

Utah Code Ann. §61-1-14.5

66

Utah Code Ann. §61-1-15

64

Utah Code Ann. §61-1-22(1)

57

Utah Code Ann. §61-l-22(l)(a)

57,58,73,74,75,81

Utah Code Ann. §61-l-22(l)(b)

57

Utah Code Ann. §61-1-22(2)

73

Utah Code Ann. §61-1-22(4)

73

Utah Code Ann. §61-1-23

l

Utah Code Ann. §61-1-24

35,47

Utah Code Ann. §61-1-27

35,47

Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-l(4)(b)

23,66

Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-4

23

Utah Code Ann. §6 3-46b-4(3)

24

Utah Code Ann. §6 3-46b-12

5

Utah Code Ann. §6 3-46b-14 (1)

1

Utah Code Ann. §6 3-46b-14 ( 3 ) (a)

xi

1

Utah Code Ann. §6 3-46b-15 (1) (a)

24

Utah Code Ann. §6 3-46b-16 (4 ) (a)

1,82

Utah Code Ann. §6 3-46b-16 (4 ) (b)

1,82

Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(c)
Utah Code Ann. §6 3-46b-16 (4 ) (d)

1,82
1,82

Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(e)

1,82

Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(g)

1,82

Utah Code Ann. §6 3-4 6b-16 ( 4 ) (h)(i)

1,82

Utah Code Ann. §6 3-46b-16(4)(h)(ii)

1,82

Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii)

1,82

Utah Code Ann. §6 3-46b-16 (4 ) (h) (iv)
Utah Uniform Securities Act

C.

1,82
44,55

OTHER AUTHORITIES:

§1904, Uniform Securities Act

47

§514, Uniform Securities Act

47
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February 25, 1991

Mary T. Noonan, Clerk
Utah Court of Appeals
230 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Re:

Case No. 900210-CA and related Case No. 900558-CA, both
involving the same parties

Dear Ms. Noonan:
On behalf of Petitioners/Appellants in the abovematters, namely, Johnson-Bowles Company, Inc., and Marlen
V. Johnson, I received the Clerk's Remittitur indicating that
because Case No. 900210-CA was ordered dismissed, the record will
be remitted back to the Third District Court. As you know, the
Remittitur follows on the heals on a ruling approximately two
weeks ago in which Case No. 900210-CA was dismissed by the Court
as "moot".
Please be advised that 900210-CA was deemed "moot"
simply because the issues and arguments contained therein were
incorporated by reference into Petitioners' Brief filed January
23, 1991, in Case No. 900558-CA. (See pages 43 and 66,
Petitioners' Brief in Case No. 900558-CA.)
The purpose of this letter is to respectfully request
that the record below -- or at least Petitioners' Briefs -- in
900210-CA be maintained on file with your Court pending a
complete determination of Case No. 900558-CA. In other words,
because 900558-CA incorporates 900210-CA by reference, the panel
hearing 900558-CA just may want to refer to 900210-CA. We simply
don't know what the panel will want to do and no doubt the Court
will want to be fully informed before rendering a decision in
900558-CA. Furthermore, the reason 900210-CA was dismissed as
"moot" is that it had no independent life of its own without
reference to the pending appeal known as 900558-CA. I would thus

Mary T. Noonan, Clerk
Page Two
February 25, 1991

think that the foregoing request is only fair and reasonable
inasmuch as 900210-CA has been specifically referenced in the
pending and on-going appeal known as 900558-CA.
Thank you for your consideration and .attention to the
/
above-matter,
Verj/_trul / y yo

fs

JMCrca
cc:

David N. Sonnenreich
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